Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1407740
missiles or other weapons. Of course, there are a lot of risks involved - armored units are usually protected by air defence weapons, enemy artillery can provide counter battery fires, tanks can and usually will shoot back and are armoured. Guerillas are much weaker, have just rifles, RPGs, IEDs and sometimes some artillery or man-portable missiles. But they are harder to find when they blend in with the local community. They do not need extensive logistics and the command chain may be composed of a local commander and messengers. Therefore, conditions to effectively use modern armies firepower were limited, compared to conventional war, but still it is possible to win at tactical level. Having actionable intelligence allows them to strike in the most important elements of every guerrilla formation - the people. Not just random, low-lev- el fighters, but commanders and other high value targets. And all kinetic effects must be accomplished by non – ki- netic effects, aimed to win "hearts and minds" of the local population, at least in theory. During the past two decades in Afghanistan, Allies, especially special operation forces have been able to achieve a number of tactical-level victories. However just like ant tactical actions must serve wider - operational and strategic goals, the tactical victories must be exploit- ed at operational and strategic levels. And here lies one of the great problems of the Afghan War. There was no strategy that was fully implemented, de- spite various declarations. While at the very beginning, the goal of Operation Enduring Freedom was destruction of Al-Qaeda, capture or elimination of AQ leaders and to deny future use of Afghanistan as a terrorists safe haven and training camp. This counterterrorist goal was achieved shortly, but 6 www.fragoutmag.com