Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1407740
not fully - Usama bin Laden and a number of members of AQ managed to split. But terrorists lost a secure place where they could prepare further attacks and most of the Taliban were also forced to leave Afghanistan and seek shelter in Pakistan. However, the situation seemed to be under control – to the point that on May 1, 2003 SecDef Rumsfeld announced that "major combat" in Afghanistan had ended. The later phase of nation building that started af- ter 2001, was ambitious and simultaneously rational. It would be a clear mistake to leave a large country in a quite unstable area of the world in a state of crisis, with- out proper basic elements of government (nation and local) especially military and some form of law enforce- ment. That would be easy prey for the next generation of radicals - and it's worth remembering that the Taliban re- gime seized power in the period of anarchy after the fall of Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. However, this requires resources. And for the country with a population of about 31 million, inhabiting an area 650 000 sq kilometres, even considering low population density (mountains and desert areas) this is a serious challenge. To secure Afghanistan at the end of 2002 there were 9,700 US soldiers deployed. Year later – about 13,000. That means that allocated human resources were at the same level that allocated to safety and security of one major American city. And while the numbers were slowly increasing, it reached 50,000 in 2009 and even 100,000 in 2010. Similar numbers of soldiers were pro- vided by other nations. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which at the beginning was responsible only for security in the Kabul area, mission was gradually expanded. The number of troops, initially 5,000 in 2002 raised to 10,000 in 2004 and took the next two years to grow to 20,000 and finally about 40,000 in 2011. Such a vacuum of power could not be left unfilled. Tali- ban, exploiting their safe haven in Pakistan took their time to regroup and mount a counterattack. When the coalition forces were expanded by troop numbers and capabilities, Taliban was already back, waging fully fledged guerilla warfare against Afghanistan government forces and co- alition troops. And while the Coalition managed to win a number of battles, it failed to build strong state and state security forces. It is simply difficult to build a strong state and its institutions in a place where the state was never strong. Where the majority – if not all – of the population is more loyal to the family, tribe and ethnic group than to the state. It is difficult to build a modern military force if 90% of recruits are illiterate, especially if those forces are cre- ated in "mirror-like" fashion, with doctrine, organization, equipment and training adapted from the larger partner. Good example in Afghanistan was airpower. ANA were equipped and trained so Afghan pilots were flying Af- ghan-marked helicopters and planes, but logistical sup- port was crucial for keeping them in the air – and was provided by Americans. Number of issues, like corruption and nepotism are also shown to have devastating effects on the morale of soldiers and further derail any nation- building efforts. It does not mean nation building is impossible. It simply re- quires clear political goals, clear narrative – so just saying to local people what shall be the effect of policy, how they will profit from this – but in terms that the locals shall un- derstand. That was not a case of Afghanistan, where US and generally Western goals were quite unclear and deci- sions were made not with long-term goals in mind but un- der pressure of current events. The outcome was human lives lost and financial expenditures. Ironically, probably if Afghanistan would have deposits of oil or other valuable 7 www.fragoutmag.com ANALYSIS