Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1446249
During peacetime facilities as such may become a target of reconnaissance and intelligence activities carried out by oth- er nations, and non-state actors as well, given their value and relevance for the state (and for the society per se). Some of the reconnaissance platforms offer the capability of collection of intelligence in a stand-off setting. This refers to sat- ellites, or aircraft flying in the interna- tional airspace, or within the limits of the spying nation's territory. Due to the lim- itations of such platforms, and the fact that only some states have platforms as such at their disposal - cheaper and simpler assets are easier to be employed here. A commercial drone, with a price tag ranging from EUR 400 to EUR 2,000 can be used to obtain aerial footage of the given facility. If flyovers are regu- lar, changes and processes taking place there can also be tracked. One may easily monitor supplies schedule. Furthermore, security may also be assessed - one may check whether patrols take place there, and if so, whether routes and schedules are fixed. Finally, one may also carry out provocative actions. A flyover of one, or more drones, in the direct vicinity, or right above the given facility should trig- ger some kind of reaction of the security service. Whether the security reacts, or not is a valuable piece of intel. The infor- mation on who and how reacted is also valuable here. As the cheap drones are viewed as toys, not as a spy tool, the re- action may be mitigated. Any person con- ducting a flyover in the restricted area, or against the legal regulations, may explain him/herself with the intention of personal use of the footage. This may lead to a situation in which an incident as such is treated lightly. Terrorism is another threat that may emerge during peacetime. Using a drone may be tempting. The UAV can easily overcome ground security measures, such as gates, fences, checkpoints, pre- cisely delivering its payload. The main problem associated with the use of cheap UAV platforms is their limited payload ca- pacity. Cheap drones usually just carry a camera - they are not designed to deliver the payload. The second-hand market is full of devices designed for dropping the payload. How- ever, the maximum payload for a drone fitted with such a system is merely a pound. These systems are suitable for a spectacular delivery of an engagement ring - not a bomb. Even if more modifica- tions are implemented (removal of camer- as for instance), the payload is still limited. One should also take the performance of the UAV (speed and endurance) into the account. Large drones can inflict more damage. DJI Matrice 600 for instance, could carry up to a 6 kilograms payload. However, it is a drone the cost of which is around 6 thousand euros. Still, the amount is not that high. However, for ter- rorists, this solution is not cost-effective, compared to backpack or vehicle-borne explosive devices. Small explosive charges could be used on purpose, to disrupt the functioning of crit- ical infrastructure, and utilize that to fuel the propaganda. It is easy to imagine a sit- uation in which somebody hits a structure within a chemical plant with a drone carry- ing a bomb, whilst recording the explosion with the use of another drone. Any explo- sion close to pipelines or tanks, smoke, and fire, and liquids or gases leaking from the facility's pipelines, with a commentary suggesting a lethal leak would be enough to create panic, even if direct effects are contained in minutes. www.fragoutmag.com