Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1446249
- such as the one in Siekierki, near War- saw. Other facilities shall also be listed here - the LNG Terminal in Świnoujście, the reloading terminal, or transport in- frastructure. Crude oil refineries and fuel storage facilities would also bear a critical value during a crisis. The list is expansive. There are 17 conventional power plants in Poland, forming the core of the state's energy system. Then, we are dealing with 55 CHPs (Combined Heat and Power Plants), even limiting ourselves to facilities supporting the main Voivodeship agglomerations, the list would be twice-as-long. The LNG termi- nal, oil terminal, and refineries (Płock, Gdańsk, Czechowice, Dziedzice, Trzebinia, Jasło) also crowd up the list - here we are dealing with another 7 facilities that require extra security measures. Fuel storage facilities come next. Further- more, the investments planned for the future would make the picture painted here even more convoluted. In the up- coming years, coal-powered power sta- tions would be less relevant, with their place being taken by wind turbines or the potential nuclear power station that is to be established in Poland. This example only refers to one, specific matter in this problem domain. When it comes to the transport infrastructure that plays a relevant role in the event of a war, or a crisis, harbors, airports, airbases, and transport nodes, or railway infrastructure, shall all be treated as rel- evant assets. The list is becoming longer, and longer. However, this does not mean that each and every facility shall have a security system of its own. Quite the opposite - considering the economic geography of Poland, numerous of the aforesaid elements of Critical Infrastructure are located in the very same region. For in- stance, the Gdynia and Gdansk harbors are located in the Tricity cluster, includ- ing the oil and container terminals. The area also includes two airports, includ- ing one that is being continuously used by the military, a crude oil refinery, and two fuel storage facilities. A floating LNG terminal is soon also going to be present in the area. This, should a crisis emerge, makes it possible to protect the area as a whole, instead of focusing on individual facilities. However, protection as such steps beyond what's possible for anyone else but the military. One needs to remember that commer- cially-available systems should be with- in reach of Police or security services. These include portable or stationary soft-kill systems using jamming to neu- tralize the UAVs. In the current circum- stances and the foreseeable future, it would be necessary to utilize the as- sets of the Armed Forces. Considering the use of tools that remain at disposal of the Armed Forces, one should get acquainted with the basic classification of anti-aircraft systems. These include three primary "layers", the fusion of which forms an integrated air defense system. The above refers to classes listed below: - VSHORAD (Very Short Range Air Defense); - SHORAD (Short Range Air Defense); - MRAD (Medium Range Air Defense). As mentioned above, these components are mutually interconnected, delivering a varied range of capabilities. MRAD systems are used to provide air defense capability against air-breathing targets at a distance exceeding 70 kilometers. The MRAD layer could also, to a limit- ed extent though, be used against bal- listic missiles. MRAD layer is the most complex, the most pricey, and the least mobile piece of the puzzle. In the case of Poland, the MRAD layer is currently based on the Newa-SC (SA-3 Goa) SAM systems. When the Wisła program is fully implemented, the legacy Newa-SC SAMs would be replaced/complemented - initially by two Patriot batteries. Since the MRAD layer is expensive and quanti- tatively limited, it would be ridiculous to expect these assets to be primarily em- ployed in the protection of critical infra- structure. At the same time, this may be a secondary task, thanks to the relatively expansive coverage that the MRAD sys- tems provide. Below, one may find the SHORAD layer - equipment used by both the Air Force, as well as by the Army. The Polish Armed Forces currently utilize the Kub SAM in this role. The replacement is to be select- ed and commissioned, within the frame- work of the Narew program. It is planned that as many as 23 batteries are pro- cured within the framework of the Nar- ANALYSIS