Frag Out! Magazine

The group was reportedly interested in the railway network, especially the routes used to transport military and humani- tarian aid to Ukraine. It remains fairly easy to find out which routes are mentioned above. It is enough to open a railway map of Poland, have a look at the Polish-Ukrainian border, and follow the railway routes connecting the border crossings, or important nodes, such as harbors or airports. The Russian in- telligence wants to learn about the aid sent to Ukraine and the destinations to which that aid is headed. Suffice it to say, that trackers installed on the trains that transport the aid have been a major problem for some time now. Methods that can be used to attack railway transport opera- tions are also fairly well-known. Even though the statement claiming that the group was "preparing acts of sabotage" in the official release is somewhat general, there are several ways that could be used to attack trains. Destruction of the rail- way tracks, the systems used to control the railway traffic, disruption of the electrical cables grid used by the railway, and attacks targeting the trains themselves - derailment or the use of explosives to disrupt the traffic. These methods may also be, theoretically, fused. It is unclear who the members of this group were. The official release claims that all 12 could be described as „foreign na- tionals from beyond the eastern border". We also know that three of them came from Belarus. Including one, a 19-years old woman. These persons were portrayed by the Lukashenko regime's media industry as ones persecuted by the Polish au- thorities. We do not know why these three persons were expo- sed. Maybe a conclusion was reached that pictures of a young woman would attract the most interest or even compassion - not confirming the accusations involved. A stereotypical spy either wears a long raincoat or is like James Bond, driving an Aston Martin and drinking a vodka martini, shaken, not stirred. Coming back to reality, one should be aware that stereotypes are irrelevant when it comes to espionage. A serial killer does not behave like Hannibal Lecter. People working for the fore- ign intelligence services may collect information directly, or transfer the intelligence they have accessed, or they may act as couriers, supervising the contact locations, finally - their involvement may either be intensive (full-time), or occasional. Motivation may also differ. The motivating factors may inclu- de ideology, finances, or family/social connections - where the father, or uncle, former USSR spy, becomes the person respon- sible for recruitment. Such a mechanism was present in the case of Walker's spy network - he started his espionage acti- vities with a colleague from the military, then recruited his son, serving in the US Navy, and wanted to persuade his daughter - also serving in the military - to join the team. One may suspect that a group so large involves people who just were recruited via social or family connections, and it is possi- ble that their degree of involvement did vary. However, the fact that the said network did conduct espionage activities is what counts here. This is important not just from the legal point of view, as it also probably confirms the earlier expectations sug- gesting that Poland, similarly to other European states, such as the Czech Republic, may become a target of sabotage or terrorism acts undertaken by the Russian intelligence services. www.fragoutmag.com

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