Frag Out! Magazine

It seems unlikely that the aforesaid network was the sole one, operating in Poland. As the official releases have shown, 20 per- sons suspected of working with Russian or Belorussian intelligence were arrested between February 24th and March 24th, 2023. Without judging whether they are guilty or not (this is to be decla- red by the courts), one may assume that there is strong evidence of the actions undertaken by those persons. Thus, it is difficult to assume that Russian or Belorussian spy networks are minor in size. Poland is a NATO frontline nation, and it has been targeted by those intelligence services for quite some time now. One may conclude that the intensity of these operations grew, as the ten- sions in Europe grew - as a greater demand for intel emerged. Despite the dynamic development of different disciplines of intelli- gence gathering - as SIGINT/ELINT, cyber intelligence, or reconna- issance satellites of a variety of types, not to mention OSINT, may all be quite valuable – the field agents are still playing a significant role. In some areas, the role they play is becoming even more important. Each area of intelligence gathering allows one to gather different information, and all of them have certain advantages and limitations. Using the example of railways - these days, to find out where the railway network is, and what the baseline characteri- stics of that network are, it is enough to use open sources, such as maps, both the general ones, as well as the ones depicting the railway network. Open sources as such, along with galleries or profiles maintained by train lovers on social media, may allow one to collect information on train movements. Analysis of traffic may, however, suffer from several disadvantages. First, photos and mo- vie clips would show what the given person wanted to capture, and then, upload. Naturally, the hobbyists would be interested in things that seem interesting to them - a locomotive wearing a retro paint scheme, or a special train. Even if someone manages to capture a military transport, and then upload the images - these would still be reporting on the past. Determining the routes taken by such transports, or the schedule or timetable is only possible if enough intelligence is gathered. Satellite reconnaissance is similar. The EO satellites are not geostationary, contrary to what Holly- wood may be telling you. By regularly capturing images depicting railway stations, certain data on timetables may be obtainable, but with a large margin of error. Again, the train timetable will only be obtainable once enough intel is gathered, after quite some time. And train timetables do change. They are also vulnerable to a variety of disruptions, especially in Poland. One may potentially observe that the weekly train from point A to point B stops for a few hours at point C, in the middle of its route. But there are many possible causes of such stops: railway traffic, temporary closure, or availability of the engine drivers. OSINT and IMINT do not „cure it all". Furthermore, these sources also cannot provide one with an answer to the key question - would that train be traveling along the same route at, the same time, next week? The military purpose of the given train can only be determined if the imagery depicts military equipment on the carriages. Heavier assets may be tough to hide, but lighter vehicles, munitions, spa- res, or light weapons may be placed in containers, and imagery would not show what is inside. Then one may only estimate the cargo flow, depending on the train length and the number of con- tainers. But many errors may be made here as well. Furthermo- re, disinformation and decoys may be used, the purpose of which would be to confuse the observers. For instance, one composition of train carriages, of identical length, with a cargo of identical ANALYSIS

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