Frag Out! Magazine

border, and start shooting when in- side the Polish territory. That would not be legally dubious. Someone crossed the border and opened fire - according to the law in force, the officers or soldiers protecting the border may respond appropria- tely. But a less clear scenario may also be considered. The shot may be taken from the other side of the border. Formally it is an act of aggression. Yet, the matter gets complicated. A regiment or a divi- sion of land forces, crossing the border, may be, without a doubt, in- terpreted as an act of aggression. But does one or a couple of shots, that may even be lethal, mean that action based on Article 5. of the North Atlantic Treaty needs to be launched? The opposing party may define this as an act of a soldier acting on his own, he may be portrayed as a tra- itor or an unknown perpetrator. No- tably, one should consider two po- ints of view here: the strategic one (where decisions are made at the top level), and the second point of view, regarding the decision made by the commanders at the lowest level, in such circumstances. What is worse, one should know that a potential border firefight would be- come an incident that would entail serious ramifications, also ones at an international level. It remains impossible to find sim- ple solutions here. One may even risk a statement, suggesting that no straightforward solutions exist at all. It is certain, however, that over the upcoming years, we are destined to face an aggressive adversary flu- ent in employing hybrid measures. Using ad hoc reaction methodolo- gy is not an effective solution here. It should be recommended that an adequate border protection system is established, stemming beyond the realm of being solely a poli- cing mechanism that designates the traffickers and sporadic ille- gal migrants as the primary thre- at. State-driven threats also need Large security deployments were sent to the border, involving Border Guard officers, supported by sol- diers and policemen. One should note that the Border Guard, for 3 decades, was viewed as a police- -like force, without heavy weapons or armored vehicles placed in its inventory. As a result of the 2022 experience, it was announced that the Border- land Security Component would be formed in the Territorial Defence Forces, consisting of 10 specia- lized battalions. In August 2023, operation "Gryf" was announced: the Border Guard units were sup- ported by 4,000 soldiers, and a mi- litary task group was formed. Due to the aggression that the soldiers and officers experienced, escalated to the level of attacks with the use of stones, sticks, and, at least once, a crossbow, targeting the vehicles, four Tur Police armored vehicles were deployed in the area - coming from the inventory of the Police's CT units. Deployment of that qu- antity of assets near the border translates into an immense wor- kload imposed on the soldiers and officers, who are forced to aban- don other tasks. Suffice it to say that the four Tur vehicles mentio- ned above constitute 50% of such platforms operated by the Police, while MBT or self-propelled artillery crews deployed to patrol the border would omit the training concerning their primary specialty. There are many more, similar examples that can be listed here. Within the framework of the ope- rational activities undertaken, re- adiness to protect the state border was being demonstrated - a lot of spectacular images were published on social media, depicting sniper or MANPADS teams, with creative de- scriptions and hashtags. Even though PR-wise, this should be viewed as a good development, anybody who knows a thing or two about the actual functioning of the uniformed services, and is aware of the legal norms, may ask a qu- estion on rules applicable to actu- ally using the means of coercion and force. The operations mentioned here are conducted with the use of peaceti- me procedures - the Armed Forces are assigned a certain set of tasks, and they support the non-milita- ry units. And this is very complex and convoluted. For instance, soldiers bearing Grom MANPADS could be deployed in the area, but the general rule of thumb is that any intruding aircraft needs to be identified and intercepted, before engagement. The legal regulations that became valid on September 1st state that if a foreign, military aircraft conducts an armed attack within the territory of Poland, ma- neuvers to attain a position good for engagement, or conducts a rec- ce sortie aimed at making that of- fensive engagement possible, then that aircraft may be destroyed, provided that the Operational Com- mander issues a relevant order. In other words, the soldiers may de- tect the intruder, but the message suggesting that a military helicop- ter was detected, even "assuming a position allowing it to conduct a strike" (hovering in front of a Polish patrol unit for instance), needs to be received at the very top of the command chain, and then an order needs to be issued, and only then an engagement may commence. And what if we are dealing with a Mi-8, wearing a civil color scheme, or having no designation whatso- ever, but equipped with weapons? The helicopter example is easy here. A helicopter may be spotted, photographed, or recorded on a video. Evidence can be gathered. One cannot buy a Mi-24 Hind at an average helicopter shop. Even if it is shot down or crashes on the Po- lish side of the border, the wrecka- ge, and the crew, dead or alive, con- stitute important evidence. Situations in which firearms are used may be even more problema- tic. In a perfect world, it would be desirable for someone to cross the www.fragoutmag.com

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