Frag Out! Magazine

undertaking rele-vant action (expansion of shelters), depending on the category of threat. Assessment and categories of threats should take the WMD and nuclear power-plant failures into account. The Ukrainian experience shows that the state needs to function despite the war, even in areas located close to the frontline. Not all citizens will be able or would be willing to move during the evacuation. These facts have been known during the times of the Polish People's Republic, hence the arrangement of spare work locations for local, city, or voivodeship defense committees outside the third destruction zone defined for nuclear strikes, or the establishment of several alternative locations in reinforced structures, for the critically exposed/vulnerable cities. To make those matters even more complicated, the plan issued by the KOK (State Defense Committee) assumed, by the end of the 1990s, that secondary C2 stations shall be made available in all Voivodeship capitals, and at all central institutions, at fortified structures of different catego-ries. As we can see, the new security context in which we are placed is forcing us to go back to the roots. Placing the template of the Ukrainian experience over our situation in shelter infrastru-ture, it needs to be said that to ensure national security during crises and wartime, shel-ters shall be made available for state organs and local authorities. That matter should not be decided upon by the given organ, it shall rather be regulated by law at the Regulation/Act level. Situation in which state organs, or local authorities that have no alternative work locations (ZMP) placed in safe, fortified structures shall not be viewed as permissi-ble. Facilities as such shall be placed outside the third zone of impact, of a nuclear strike, targeting the given city. Furthermore, it shall be noted that some of the personnel assigned to the aforesaid or-gans shall get a chance to deploy mobile ZMP SK 2 (Spare Work Locations/Control Stations 2) assets, to increase the level of structure survivability. Readymade technical solutions are available on the Polish market, based on properly equipped vehicle sets and containerized assets – they may also be used to deploy field C2 stations for rescue operations. Securing stations as such at the Voivodeship level (16 sets in the first stage), would significantly enhance the crisis opera- tional capabilities, and also enhance the wartime survivability of the structures. Moving on to the technicalities, one should consider the array of technical parameters as-signed to civil defense infrastructure, designed to protect the civilians, local authorities, central organs, or staff assigned to critical infrastructure. ANALYSIS

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