Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1532587
four airframes. During peacetime and crisis, these could be supplemented by tethered radar balloons (so-called aerostats), but in wartime, these would be easy targets. Equally important are electronic warfa- re aircraft and aerial refueling and transport aircraft. These are often referred to as "force multipliers" for good reason—electronic warfare and AEW aircraft enable early threat detection, improve situational awareness, and enhance fighter and air defense co- ordination. Aerial tankers, on the other hand, extend the endurance of fighter aircraft in the air and incre- ase their range for offensive operations. Offensive operations, such as air power projection, could become the second pillar of effective air com- bat against Russia. The once-mythical anti-access/ area-denial (A2/AD) bubbles have proven to be highly permeable, and the war in Ukraine has demonstrated that even primitive means, such as a simple drone or a sports aircraft adapted into a strike drone, can penetrate Russian airspace and strike military and economic targets supporting the war effort. This vali- dates the decision made long before 2022 to procure JASSM cruise missiles (370 km range) for Poland's F-16s, later supplemented by JASSM-ER missiles (900+ km range) ordered in 2024. A large quanti- ty of the latter was ordered - the U.S. government approved a potential sale of up to 821 missiles, with "several hundred" officially confirmed. However, as these are air-launched missiles, they have one advan- tage and one disadvantage: they can be launched from over the Baltic Sea or allied territory, extending their range, but they also require aircraft to carry them, which limits available fighter jets. A single strike using 24 AGM-158s would require 12 carriers. To further enhance force projection, Poland could develop a land-based arsenal of cruise missiles and other long-range unmanned strike systems. The two Naval Missile Units ordered two years ago, equipped with NSM missiles (180+ km range), could already target sites in Kaliningrad and Belarus. However, Poland could also develop even simple strike drones or long-range cruise missiles to improve strike ca- pabilities against Russia. Given that Ukraine has suc- cessfully developed such capabilities under wartime conditions, there is no reason Poland's industry could not achieve the same. This could lead to the esta- blishment of a new tactical unit within the Air Force dedicated to operating such strike systems (missiles and unmanned platforms). The evolving security environment and the Russian threat also extend to the maritime domain. Russia possesses both surface and submarine forces that can pose a threat, is actively developing unmanned underwater and surface vehicles, and has a capable naval aviation component. Currently, Poland's naval capabilities are limited. Sin- ce Russia can threaten Polish (and allied) maritime interests through hybrid operations (such as attacks on offshore wind farms, gas pipelines, and undersea cables) as well as conventional means, an adequate response capability is essential. The role of unmanned systems in this domain is also expected to grow. To defend its maritime interests, Poland must have a presence at sea, which necessitates warships. Launching three "Miecznik"-class frigates is an ab- solute minimum, particularly since these vessels are expected to frequently participate in allied na- val task forces beyond the Baltic. However, Poland's navy must also maintain a constant presence in the Baltic, capable of detecting and responding to thre- ats ranging from missile strikes to underwater sa- botage. Expanding the "Miecznik" program, possibly with an additional three frigates, and complementing them with new vessels, perhaps corvettes, would strengthen Poland's maritime defense. Corvettes shall be provided with ASW and ASuW capabilities, also in the area of countering unmanned maritime as- sets. During a conventional war, these vessels would operate in maritime groups with frigates, benefiting from their air defense umbrella. Additionally, mainta- ining submarine capabilities is essential, necessitating the procurement of new submarines. The ability to operate covertly is invaluable. A future Polish combat surface fleet could consist of at least three missile frigates and six corvettes. Regarding the submari- ne component, a mix of conventional submarines and miniature units could be cost-effective in the Baltic Sea, particularly for stealthy defensive and offensive operations in coastal waters. A fleet of three subma- rines of each type is conceivable. The combat forces would be complemented by MCMVs, including the in-service and under-construction Kormoran-class vessels, with six ordered in total. Rescue and under- water operations units are also necessary, with the "Ratownik" program envisioning two such vessels in service. Other essential units include two ELINT/SI- GINT ships, new survey vessels to replace the two currently in use, two degaussing ships, and at least one training ship. In terms of logistics and transport, at least two supply ships will be required to replace the existing tankers. This extensive vision, undoubtedly more of a holiday wish list, overlooks less visible but equally important military functions, such as special forces, cyber war- fare units, and medical components. When the time comes to address these aspects, it will be crucial to consider both the current and future geopolitical landscape, which will shape the desired structure and scale of the armed forces. ANALYSIS