Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1532587
(such as UH-60, AW149, or similar models) per division would be required, amounting to a minimum of 64 he- licopters. This number may need to be higher, as their roles extend beyond supporting mechanized divisions. The need for light helicopters remains an open question, as some of their traditional reconnaissance and anti-tank roles are increasingly being taken over by drones. Ho- wever, drones will not fully replace them, so maintaining a small number, perhaps half the quantity of multi-role helicopters, could be considered. This does not mean that helicopters should be permanently assigned to tactical units. A more rational approach in peacetime would be to maintain a separate army aviation brigade, which could allocate helicopter squadrons to divisional commands as needed for operational tasks. The Territorial Defense constitutes the second pillar of the land-based framework of defensive assets. In their case, capability development is simpler since they do not require heavy equipment. Their tasks, such as protecting critical infrastructure and securing their rear areas, pri- marily require light anti-tank and anti-aircraft (including unmanned) weapons. In wartime, however, beyond pro- tection, they would also be responsible for defending the border. The brigades located in the east should especially be seen as a supplement to the capabilities of operational forces in the event of a conventional war. In the event of a conflict with Russia, the air compo- nent of the armed forces will be of crucial importance. According to the 2024 Military Balance data, Russia's air force had over 1,100 combat aircraft, including 878 fighters, multirole aircraft, and attack aircraft, as well as an additional 148 aircraft in naval aviation. On top of that, Russia had 129 bombers, essentially cruise missile carriers, such as the Tu-22M, Tu-95, and Tu-160. As for helicopters, Russia had about 340 attack helicopters and 307 transport helicopters, plus a small number of the- se types in naval aviation. Of course, these numbers are constantly changing. Since 2022, Russia has lost at least 235 destroyed aircraft and helicopters in Ukraine, in ad- dition to those damaged beyond cost-effective repair and those that have been or will soon be retired due to wear and tear. On the other hand, Russia still retains the ca- pability to manufacture aircraft, but economic conditions and sanctions will likely mean that new deliveries will not fully compensate for losses. Additionally, it is difficult to assess whether the Russian industry will be able to intro- duce new types of combat aircraft into production. Deli- veries of the newest aircraft, the Su-57, are already pro- gressing slowly. It is therefore possible that, as on land, Russia will prioritize quantity over quality, continuing to produce established designs such as the Su-35 and Su- 34 while also focusing on unmanned assets, including both drones and cruise missiles (including sea-launched variants). These assets could be used to attack critical infrastructure, particularly energy infrastructure, as de- monstrated in Ukraine, and restrict military movement. This, of course, necessitates an effective air defense system, which can be achieved through the continuation of existing programs such as Wisła, Narew, and Pilica, among others. Given that air threats can target infra- structure without requiring a land invasion, expanding these programs is a more urgent priority than forming a fifth or sixth land forces division. Regarding combat aviation, the current and projected state in the coming years is better than that of the Land Forces. The fleet of 48 F-16s, which will undergo mo- dernization, along with 32 F-35s, will form the backbone of the air force. However, consideration must soon be given to successors for the F-16s. This provides a total of 80 aircraft. It is a solid force that, according to current plans, will be supplemented by 48 light F/A-50 aircraft. These will eventually reach their intended operational standard and take on some training duties, simpler fighter missions, and, most importantly, close air support tasks. However, since this is a time for holiday wishes, one mi- ght consider reducing this program in favor of acquiring different aircraft. In a perfect world, a competitive pro- curement process would have been conducted in 2022, and perhaps instead of the Korean aircraft, Poland would have purchased 48 additional F-16s or another combat aircraft, such as the JAS-39 Gripen. However, the con- tracts have been signed, and the decision has been made. Despite all doubts, the FA-50s will at least free up more expensive aircraft for other tasks. Since the current fleet and signed contracts provide a total of 128 combat aircraft, fleet expansion could be considered. This currently manifests in ambitions to acquire "air superiority fighters." Two additional squ- adrons: whether F-15s, Eurofighters, or simply more F-35s; would bring the total to 160 combat aircraft. While this number is significantly smaller than Russia's fleet, it offers qualitative superiority. Another factor, as with the Land Forces, is allied support, which can arrive very quickly. Allied aircraft can be deployed to Poland or its vicinity before a conflict erupts or rapidly reinforce Polish forces. Therefore, Poland's air potential must also include the support that could be provided by the U.S. and NATO's European members. If, for example, an additional 48 USAF F-35s, another 48 from European nations (Ger- many, the Netherlands, Belgium, and the Czech Republic), and air superiority aircraft, conservatively assuming 24 F-22 Raptors from the U.S. and 40 Rafales from France, were added, Poland's combat air fleet would effectively double. For Russia, such a force would be an extremely difficult adversary, even assuming that a significant por- tion of allied forces would be engaged on other fronts (e.g., in Scandinavia, which is why British, German, and Italian Eurofighters are not included in this scenario). Beyond combat aircraft, acquiring support aircraft is also crucial. Effectively utilizing such a large combat fleet requires airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft, at least www.fragoutmag.com