Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1532587
Paradoxically, the personnel challenge in such an expan- ded land force structure could be addressed relatively easily. Some brigades and battalions would not need to be fully manned in peacetime; they could function as training units with varying degrees of readiness, sup- plemented by both active and passive reserve soldiers. Returning to equipment considerations, under this sce- nario, the land forces would field a total of 1,682 tanks, 1,102 IFVs, and 928 armored personnel carriers, not counting training centers and additional equipment beyond combat unit allocations. Using the simplest me- thod to estimate an aggressor's force requirements, maintaining 3,766 combat vehicles in service would force the Russians to achieve a three-to-one superio- rity. This means that without 10,000 tanks, IFVs, and armored personnel carriers, a land invasion would be a risky endeavor. This calculation does not take into account the possi- ble composition of support forces. Two divisional and four brigade-level battalions of 155mm self-propelled howitzers, each with 24 guns, amount to a total of 144 artillery pieces. Additionally, two rocket artillery batta- lions provide 48 launchers. On top of that, the Ottokar- -Brzoza tank destroyer program could further enhance capabilities, with 32 tank destroyers per division (for- ming an anti-tank regiment), totaling 96 launchers (and this is just at the divisional level). Unmanned systems, such as those procured through the Gladius program, could also contribute significantly. When discussing the defense of the eastern border, engineering prepara- tions will also impact defensive capabilities, increasing overall potential and making operations more difficult for the Russians. Furthermore, the firepower of the land forces could be further enhanced. Ambitious plans for acquiring missile systems, both from the U.S. and South Korea, could enable the formation of a standalone rocket ar- tillery brigade, as initially planned in 2023. Armed with HIMARS systems, this brigade would be capable of striking targets at long distances and would remain outside the divisional structure. Additionally, some of the new NSM launchers ordered in 2023 could be in- tegrated into this brigade. While these systems are not designed for tank destruction, they can target hi- gh-value assets, disrupting the enemy's command and logistics network. This raises the question of whether forming two ad- ditional divisions makes sense. There may be a shor- tage of both equipment and personnel for them. One possibility is to treat these divisions as training units, where volunteers and, if conscription is reinstated, mandatory service members would be trained, along with exercises for both passive and active reserve tro- ops. However, ensuring the necessary training infra- structure, equipment, and funding will be a challenge. Without these, the divisions may prove ineffective in wartime. Even if they can be staffed during mobiliza- tion, a lack of equipment would reduce them to light infantry, leaving them vulnerable on a European battle- field. An alternative approach would be to forego their formation entirely and redirect the saved resources toward other capabilities. It is also important to re- member that Poland is and will remain a NATO member, and allied troops are already stationed on its territory. In the event of escalating tensions that could lead to large-scale conflict, securing prior support from allies will be a strategic objective. As a result, one or two U.S. divisions, a German Army division, and brigades from France, the UK, the Netherlands, and Denmark could be deployed on Polish soil. Land forces, however, are just one part of the armed forces, and even within the land forces, there is more than just tanks, infantry, and artillery. There are also engineering regiments, reconnaissance units, electro- nic warfare, and chemical defense forces that exist outside divisional structures. The logistical component will also need significant reinforcement. Finally, an essential element of the land forces is the airmobile units and their associated army aviation as- sets. The role of the 6th Airborne Brigade is clearly de- fined. It is a highly mobile tactical unit capable of rapid deployment via aircraft, whether through parachute drops, helicopter landings, or landing at airfields (inc- luding improvised ones). The 25th Air Cavalry Brigade, however, presents a challenge. It is a remnant of an overly ambitious plan to build an entire airmobile divi- sion. Given the expected high maneuverability of future conflicts, retaining both the airborne and helicopter brigades is rational, provided they are well-equipped with anti-tank weapons and air-transportable vehicles. When it comes to anti-tank assets, attack helicopters are another key component. Even if the planned order of 96 Apache helicopters were reduced to 48 or 72, they would still provide significant support for land forces, though they would not be the only option. The need for multi-role and transport helicopters remains open. At a minimum, acquiring at least one (prefera- bly two or three) squadrons of heavy transport he- licopters (such as the CH-47 Chinook) and additional multi-role helicopters is essential. Recent floods and battlefield realities have underscored the importance of such equipment: while attack helicopters can be supplemented or even replaced by drones, transport helicopters cannot. Given that the proposed vision includes four land for- ce divisions, the Apache order could be reduced to 64 units: one squadron (16 helicopters) per division. Simi- larly, at least one squadron of multi-role helicopters ANALYSIS