Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1532587
range exceeding 10 km. Going even deeper, further questions arise regarding the placement of anti-tank assets within subunits, particularly in light of the acquisition of heavy Carl Gustaf grenade launchers, which might be best positioned within a dedicated support detachment at the company level. Of course, these forces would require protection from enemy aircraft and drones. The bare minimum to be provided should assume that they must be equipped with air defense systems, including Narew system batteries at the anti-aircraft regiment level and shorter-range systems within brigade-level air defense battalions. This is just the minimum, as the equation must also include counter-UAS systems, brigade-level protection, as demonstrated by Ukra- ine's experience, is insufficient. An open question still left unanswered refers to the capabilities and structure of the other two divisions. Given that the two existing mechanized divisions are naturally designated for the defense of eastern Po- land and that a war with the Czech Republic or Ger- many is not anticipated, the 11th Lubusz Armored Cavalry Division, stationed in the west, appears to be maintaining its long-assumed role as a reserve force, capable of supporting both maneuver defense and, in a favorable situation, transitioning to a coun- teroffensive. This division currently consists of three armored ca- valry brigades, two of which are armored units, while the third has been a motorized brigade equipped with Rosomak vehicles for the past two decades. Seve- ral possible paths for the division's evolution can be considered. First, it could be retained in its current form with only equipment modernization. However, this would mean that the formation would be weaker than the two previously mentioned divisions. Additionally, by definition, this should be a division with a lot of fire- power at its disposal. Thus, it makes sense not only to maintain but also to strengthen its armored potential. Since the adopted model for land forces assumes four brigades with four battalions each, this could be implemented as a structure comprising three armored brigades and one mechanized brigade. Furthermore, in this new structure, the division would have the same tacti- cal formations and support units as the 18th and 16th divisions. Structure as such for it, assuming three tank battalions per armored brigade and two per mechanized brigade, the division would require 638 tanks and 290 IFVs. This would be an enormo- us number, posing significant training and logistical challenges, but the division's combat potential would be substantial. ANALYSIS