Frag Out! Magazine
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Additionally, Russia is likely to pursue cost-effective solutions, just as it has done with cheap, rudimentary aircraft or UAVs, like Shahed-136 drones supplementing expensive cruise mis- siles and low-cost FPV drones complementing traditional anti- -tank guided missiles and artillery. Poland, however, is in a far worse position: it lacks the ability to achieve a superiority in numbers, partly due to demographic constraints. Sacrificing Polish soldiers in the same manner as the Russians is not an option. The situation is equally complex when it comes to equipment. The key capabilities required for conventional warfare, namely artillery, tanks, air defense, and electronic warfare, have hi- storically been modernized in a fragmented manner. For in- stance, while one brigade was equipped with Leopard tanks or Rosomak APCs, others still operated outdated T-72s and BWP-1 IFVs. Similarly, alongside modern Grom air defense (MANPADS) systems, Poland continued to rely on aging Kub and Neva SAMs. The rapid and large-scale purchases made in recent years have only partially addressed the issue, as much of the older equipment was transferred to Ukraine, and integrating new systems takes time. A compromise must be found between quantity and quality, with an emphasis on leve- raging quality to counterbalance quantitative disadvantages. The expansion plans outlined in recent years have been, to put it diplomatically, highly ambitious. The goal was to establish six expanded land divisions, each consisting of four brigades with four battalions per brigade, totaling 300,000 personnel in peacetime (including the Territorial Defense Forces) and 450,000 when factoring in the active reserve. Maintaining the current structure, where each battalion ope- rates 58 armored vehicles (tanks, IFVs, or APCs), would mean that six divisions, each with four brigades and four battalions per brigade (96 battalions in peacetime), would require an astronomical 5,568 combat vehicles just for frontline units. This figure excludes reserves (both for maintenance and war- time mobilization) and training equipment. Reducing battalion vehicle numbers to 44 would still leave 4,224 vehicles. Again, without factoring in additional reserves. These calculations also exclude specialist vehicles (e.g., reconnaissance, medical evacuation, command vehicles), artillery, air defense systems, and logistical support vehicles such as trucks and transpor- ters. And this is just at the division level, without even consi- dering other branches of the armed forces. What should the Polish military look like in 2040? Geography provides key insights into the necessary structu- re of future land forces. Any defensive war would be fought primarily in the east, where the potential enemy is located, at least when it comes to the land domain. Two strong divisions are already stationed there, the 18th Mechanized Division and the 16th Mechanized Division. Each currently consists of three brigades: the 18th Division comprises one armored brigade, one mechanized brigade, and one Highland [Podhale] Rifles brigade. In both brigades, a fourth motorized element is formed. Positioned strategically, they are well-suited for defensive operations along Poland's eastern border. It is reasonable to assume that these divisions, currently re- ceiving new M1 Abrams and K2 tanks, as well as modern ar- tillery, will also be equipped with new Borsuk infantry fighting vehicles and wheeled armored personnel carriers. Whether these will be Rosomak APCs fitted with ZSSW-30 RCWS or an entirely new design remains to be seen - regardless of that, they should be integrated with anti-tank capability. Conside- ration should also be given to standardizing unit structures by converting the motorized brigade in the 18th Division into a mechanized brigade.This would result in both divisions having: One armored brigade (three tank battalions, one mechanized battalion); Two mechanized brigades (each with two tank battalions and two mechanized battalions); One motorized/Hi- ghland Rifles brigade (four battalions using wheeled APCs for rapid maneuverability). Following the "Model 58" standard, each division would then have: 406 main battle tanks, 290 IFVs, and 232 wheeled APCs. The optimal balance of tanks and infantry in these brigades remains an open question. The emerging model envisions: Ar- mored brigades with three tank battalions and one mechani- zed battalion, motorized brigades (Highland Rifle), with four infantry battalions, mechanized brigades with two mechanized battalions and two tank battalions. Ironically, this structure mirrors reforms from the late 1980s and early 1990s when the Polish Army transitioned from an offensive posture to a defensive one under General Siwicki's restructuring, which introduced a unified mechanized regiment with a similar tank- -to-infantry ratio. Ensuring adequate support assets is also crucial. Each divi- sion, following current or recently announced plans, would likely include an artillery brigade, a logistics regiment, an engi- neering regiment, an air defense regiment, a reconnaissance battalion, and other essential units. Within the brigades, the- re would be organic support elements such as artillery and air defense batteries, logistics battalions, and UAV units. Proce- eding with a very conservative estimate, this translates into four brigade-level artillery battalions and, at the division level, an artillery brigade, which currently consists of two self-pro- pelled howitzer battalions and two rocket artillery battalions. Naturally, these would be complemented by unmanned recon- naissance-strike systems (such as those procured under the Gladius program) and anti-tank systems (given the existen- ce of the Ottokar-Brzoza program). One could also envision an additional unit: an anti-tank regiment equipped with both unmanned systems and long-range guided anti-tank missiles. Further reinforcements could also be introduced at a lower level. Brigades could be supplemented with an additional bat- tery of rocket artillery and unmanned systems (e.g., loite- ring munitions), increasing their strike capability. Moreover, considering how crucial drones, guided missiles, and artillery have become on the battlefield, the enhancements could go even further. Mechanized or motorized battalions have the- ir own support companies, which could also be expanded to include unmanned systems or guided anti-tank missiles with a www.fragoutmag.com