Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1064315
put it simply, the FGM-148 was developed to meet certain specific re- quirements and fill a specific gap in the system of the US Army. And it serves its purpose perfectly. The situation is much different in the case of Poland, though. Here, a big advantage in numbers of a potential enemy and the natural landscape forcing a small direct firing range, but featuring many diverse natural obstacles which can hide targets, favors solutions that make it possible to attack the enemy at a greater distance than the direct range of obser- vation. That's why already in 2002, during the final arrangement of the setting for the Spike for Poland, it was decided to resign from the more basic version – the MR (where the guidance solution is basically the same as that of the FMG-148) – and get a smaller number of LRs, which offer a much better performance, including mainly the option to attack targets in the BLOS mode. The reasoning behind the choices made back then is still relevant. The main problem is the small number of launchers, which is due to budget limitations and a certain aberration of MND, which claims that "art is art" and for whom the ancient Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger) has the same value in comparison sheets as the state-of-the-art Spike. As a result, the number of systems available to mechanized battalions is right "on paper". This makes it much easier to keep on doing nothing and postponing the making of difficult and costly decisions. In addition, there is an attempt to integrate the Spike with the Rosomak proceeding in the background – either as part of the existing turrets or the new ZSSW-30 RCWS – which won't be put into operation before 2022. The outcome? The Rosomak brigades have only 18 Spike launchers and nothing more. Apart from the 116 AT-3 used with BMP-1s, the mechanized brigades are to receive 9 to 18 Spikes, but the process is getting longer and longer. The only hope lies in the accumulation of the systems in the 25th Air Cavalry Brigade and the 6th Airborne Brigade – 81 Spikes per brigade sounds reasonable. Unfortunately, the quoted numbers mean that there will be 102 Spike launchers left for the rest of the Polish Armed Forces. And we know the consequences of such a situation. And so, there are way too few Spikes alone in PAF. The above, coupled with all other maladies of our anti-tank defense system, translates into an urgent need to reinforce Poland's anti-tank defense solutions – even though the Spike alone is a fine weapon of great potential. It would be then necessary to at least double the number of the launchers at PAF's disposal. And adopting a new system doesn't seem reasonable. First, there is a local Spike ser- vice center currently under construction, and the system itself is well- known and comes with proven training resources. Second – regardless of the gravity of the problems the domestic manufacturer of the system faces, the fact that 20-25% of manufacturing takes place in Poland is a big argument 'for' the system. The idea to treat the sickness-stricken of the Polish defense industry by taking their bread away does not seem the right way. But the most important argument is the tactical-technical qualities of the Spike, all fitting the Polish context very well. After all, the opinion of the system's end users is known and expressed very clearly: "We want the Spike!". The question is whether the decision-makers at MOD are going to take it into consideration. LAND FORCES