Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1086092
The word "hybrid" is crucial to the un- derstanding of this phenomenon and the threats related thereto. Analysts involved in the Multinational Capability Development Campaign program run under the auspices of NATO have offered the following defini- tion of hybrid warfare in their executive summary: synchronized use of multiple instruments of power tailored to specific vulnerabilities across the full spectrum of societal functions to achieve synergistic ef- fects. This means an engagement of various measures – military, economic, diplomat- ic, and information measures, in different mutual configurations. It doesn't mean, however, that each of these measures has to be always used and that one of them is more important than another. It could be described using the metaphor of a toolbox: depending on the situation, we reach for different tools – which we can freely adapt and adjust in advance as necessary. On the other hand, a country attacked in such a way does not have this freedom to adapt and adjust. Particular elements of a country's defenses, its tools, are – by defi- nition – distributed across different boxes and a coordinated engagement thereof is difficult – if only because of the fact that a threat may be either imperceptible or – when discovered – may be wrongly inter- preted, and it may be even impossible to tell which institutions or services should deal with the problem. It is a different situation than a conventional, typical conflict, where irregular, psychological, and other activ- ity only supplements the battle fought by armies head-on. Also, the objective of such activity is not to gain victory on the battlefield – the use of regular forces crowns the outcomes of non-conventional and non-kinetic opera- tions. To use another metaphor – one of a football game. Standard warfare involves a combat on a battlefield, like a fair football game played on a pitch. The players' moti- vation or the supporters' cheers can help, but will not replace effective ball-kicking. Meanwhile, hybrid warfare is a game where a forward of the opposing team is bribed to shoot – and miss, the remaining players are set at variance so that they eventually stop playing as a team, the referee is pres- sured as necessary, and in the end it turns out that the players have had their shoes stolen. A game to be played by a so weak- ened team will be a nail in the coffin – and the same goes for an attacked army and country. The concept is described in more scientific terms in an analysis published by the West Point Modern War Institute. Its author, Captain J. Chambers, has compared the phases of military operations during a con- flict according to the American and Russian doctrines in use. In the Russian doctrine, five out of eight phases of conflict involve pursuing activities in the "gray zone" even before open warfare starts – whereas in the American case, there are only two out of five such activities – defined in a rather general manner ("shape" and "deter"). The five stages of the Russian doctrine include elements such as special operations to mislead the enemy or bribing the govern- ment and military officers of the attacked country. Open military action is to be an act of mercy, in assumption at least, and may be launched in the form of an intervention or stabilization mission, aiming officially to protect own citizens in a country engulfed in internal conflict (sounds familiar?). In practice it means that hybrid warfare can be effective if there is a way to disin- tegrate the society and state structures. And again, unlike in the case of a standard armed conflict, when there's enough to drop a bomb on some target, – say, a bridge – the gray zone looks for a crack that can be used to own advantage. Such cracks involve social divisions, especially those that do or may have a political background, which is the case of the Ukraine. The hotbed of the conflict, fueled and taken advantage of by Russia, were the differences in the atti- tudes among the people of the western and eastern Ukraine regarding the Ukrainian nationality, language, and state as such. A big number of the inhabitants of these lands felt attached to Russia. The divisions, re- sulting from the demographic and econom- ic processes taking place under the USSR reign, which the Ukraine didn't manage to deal with, have been taken advantage of by Russia. The anti-Ukrainian resentments in the current activity addressed at the Polish society, based often on historical prejudice, related to e.g. the Volhynia massacre, are used in a similar way. It is no coincidence – the campaign was to change the attitude of the Polish after the outbreak of the crisis in the Ukraine, when Poland's government of the time strongly supported the new – pro-Western – authorities in Kiev. Poland may also become a target if there is a cri- sis in the Baltic region. This is because our country is a bridge between Latvia, Lithua- nia, and Estonia and other NATO countries. Triggering a crisis in Poland may delay or hinder transferring allied forces through our country. The initiation of hybrid warfare, a certain artillery preparation, is activity aimed at deepening the divisions and radicalizing the displayed attitudes – in an ideal scenar- io on both sides of the internal conflict. In the simplest scenario it is limited only to propaganda, especially one that is faked as www.fragoutmag.com