Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1086092
tridge clip used with Beryls or Walther P99s on the spot. This fact alone is not a sufficient proof to claim that the shooter is a soldier or a policer officer. Depending on the 'orientation' of the rally, whether it was a pro-government assembly or the opposition's event, it's easy to promote either of the two narratives: "a rebel soldier opposes the government" versus "the government forces police officers to shoot at the opposition", because the evidence found is unquestionable. Something like this has happened, but in a slightly different context. After the March 2004 terrorist attack in Madrid, the Spanish government of the time was not able to deal effectively with the situ- ation in the information domain, addition- ally spreading false information about the offenders itself. The opposition adopted the narrative, which resulted in its vic- tory in the parliamentary election. Then, the political consequences were signif- icant but still within the framework of democratic governance, where a change of governments and their policies by way of election is a standard. But the con- sequences of hybrid warfare are much more grave. Acts of sabotage or terror- ism (and other provocations) can lead to an invasion of foreign forces. All this gets even more complicated be- cause in this case, the instigator is a for- eign state, with amounts of resources beyond anything at the disposal of ter- rorist organizations. It is possible that such operations may involve the engage- ment of special forces, of the weaponry they usually use, and of the necessary logistic support. Even if the actual 'ex- ecutors' of the said schemes are people from another country, – only inspired or supported by their principals – this will still mean a whole new level of threat. It's enough to mention that the terrorist organizations supported in a similar way in the West during the Cold War – such as PIRA, RAF or the Red Brigades – were able to launch attacks that were more precise and effective in the domain of pol- itics than what the contemporary organi- zations are capable of. It's just like Franz said to Marian Słaby in the Polish crime thriller entitled "Psy" (roughly translat- ed as "Pigs" in the meaning of 'cops') – terrorists acting with the support of a foreign state "are able to find, track down, plan, and kill", whereas the limit of jihadists' abilities is to shoot at random people in public environments. Here, they have an option to use armor-piercing grenade launchers, mortars, or man-por- table air-defense systems. In such a situation, there is an increased risk of attacks aimed at targets that are more difficult to attack but have a sig- nificant symbolic meaning, such as public persons, manifestations, monuments, museums, and even churches, temples or schools. Such attacks are to destabilize the society by deepening and exacerbat- ing internal conflicts. Emotions accompa- nying such events can be easily targeted in a desired way, by e.g. spreading con- spiracy theories. Attacks at military men or officers from other uniformed ser- vices can arouse some strong emotions too – such events may be reported as evidence of ineffectiveness of those who are to protect the state and its citizens. Another option involves attacks at facil- ities of crucial economic significance – including power plants, electrical grids, refineries, trans-shipment terminals, fuel depots, etc. Here, there can be two types of consequences. One type involves direct economic consequences in the form of interrupted power or fuel sup- plies; the other type concerns – again – psychological consequences. A relatively simple attack, a single shot from a gre- nade launcher fired at a fuel depot or a tank truck, can cause panic – it's enough to offer some impressive shots of a burn- ing tank, flames, and trails of smoke to illustrate a piece of fake news suggest- ing that the fuel supplies at gas stations are almost depleted, and there will be no new supplies because of the threats of further attacks. Interruptions in the sup- ply of power to large urbanized areas – because of e.g. power lines being broken – can have even worse consequences. In the long run it would mean some part of public transportation coming to a halt, factories suspending their regular opera- tion, no possibility to do shopping (where any supplies are left at all), and problems with telecommunications. The political and social consequences – which can be caused only by threats of launching an- other attack in a different place – will be even more serious. Preventing and reacting to such threats involves therefore two elements. One is kinetic activity, aimed at eliminating the threat – the sabotage or terrorist group, and the other is about non-kinet- ic activity – undertaken in the domain of information. Both are closely related to each other. It's also easier to tell which services are responsible for preventing and reacting to physical threats. The activity of for- eign sabotage groups or terrorist organi- zations sponsored by a foreign state is a threat that is to be statutorily dealt with by special services (mainly the Internal Security Agency), the Police and the Bor- der Guard. These services are particular- ly able to detect symptoms of threats, even early ones. Since such a threat does not follow the model of an open invasion, it is very likely that the initial situation will look like an activity of a criminal or terrorist group, not of a foreign state. This causes a problem with reacting di- rectly to such threats because it may turn out that both the Border Guard and the Police find themselves in the front line of the conflict in hybrid warfare – like in the case of the Ukraine. A partial solu- tion to such challenges is the special sub- units existing in the structures of the Police and the Border Guard, with their mission to combat particularly dangerous criminals. In recent years, the situation of these sub-units, especially the police anti-terrorist squads, has considerably improved thanks to important – although not too spectacular – internal reforms and a partial change in the principles of their engagement, according to the act on anti-terrorist actions. Besides, the Police or the Border Guard www.fragoutmag.com