Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1115818
matter of reforming the structures of the lowest-rank sub-units for two decades now as this would require a range of in-depth and multi-facet- ed operations and tests of new structures and their equipment, which is something beyond the current capabilities of the Polish Armed Forces from the level of battalion upwards. And this is to mean both mental ca- pabilities and the actual abilities to carry out the relevant R&D works. There's no will, there's no mention of such needs at the decision-making level – the adopted approach is about pretending the problem doesn't exist. Some efforts made at the battalion level, undertaken bottom-up by soldiers and officers, get lost somewhere on the way from the brigade level up. The issue of structures is linked closely to the issue of anti-tank and support weapons. The fire power of the KTO Rosomak is significant thanks to its excellent 30-mm Bushmaster gun and acceptable fire con- trol system, but the vehicle has not been yet integrated with the Spike ATGM system. Also, Rosomaks are poorly armored and very large objects – their survivability is no different from that of other wheeled armored vehicles, and actually much worse than that of modern IFVs from the West. Descriptions of the fire power and the anti-tank potential of the BWP-1 would be best found in historical monographs. The ancient Maly- utka ATGM systems are no match for tanks, and supporting own infantry using a smoothbore low-pressure gun is not very effective. We have two problems in that case. The first is the terrible condition of anti-tank de- fenses of platoons, which is based on Malyutka ATGMs used with BWP-1 (or nothing used with KTO Rosomaks) after the "Komar" launchers were put out of service, and on RPG-7s and rifle grenades. In fact, the Polish platoons have no good measures to combat tanks effectively. The issue of the main source of the fire power of platoons is unclear either – the BWP-1 is not such a source, and is to be replaced "someday" with the BWP Borsuk with a modern ZSSW-30 turret integrated with a dual launcher of Spike ATGMs. The Borsuk itself will be also an amphibious vehicle, which means it will be lightly armored and prone to automatic gun attacks. In terms of the fire power, the KTO Rosomak performs comparably to most IFVs, but in terms of its endurance on the battlefield it is no different than... wheeled armored vehicles. As a result, the most urgent matter is to improve the anti-tank capabilities of infantry platoons and to acquire support weapons able to enhance the fire power of platoons noticeably. We need to bear in mind the relative susceptibility of Rosomaks to direct fire (ATGMs, RPGs, automatic guns) of a strong enemy and the fact that the Borsuk will perform not much better here – it would be good then if losing a part of a platoon's vehicles did not make the platoon unable to carry on with its operations. Notwithstanding the matter of structures and the shy attempts to look for support weapons, a real problem to be deal with by the Polish Armed Forces is to find a successor to the withdrawn "Komars" and RPG-7s. What quantities are we talking about? Excluding TDF and SOF from our calculations, it can be assumed that the 6th and the 25th brigade have a total of 200 grenade launchers at their disposal. The 17 mechanized battalions of our Land Forces have 47 reg- ular RPG-7s each, which gives a total of about 800 weapons. Our six mo- torized battalions have 50 regular "rg-rur" each – 300 in total. The good old RPG-7s are used also in tank battalions (55 in total, 5 per each of the 11 battalions) and by combat engineers, chemists, and artillery units in similar 'homeopathic doses', i.e. about 200 weapons in total. The story doesn't end here because wartime involves a mobilization of 18 facility protection and defense battalions and around 30 facility protection and LAND FORCES