Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1193118
in the times when C4ISR systems were far less efficient. An attack involving fast missile boats stood a chance of success if rapidly assuming launch position and rapid retreat were possible. Only these could have limited the chance of using relevant countermeasures. During these times tactical datalinks were in their in- fancy. This means that transmission and processing of targeting data was much slower. Small size, speed and agility could have protected them from dumb bombs and unguided rockets. Guided missiles would have been effective though. On the other hand, major advancements could have been noticed in the domain of anti-ship missiles. Soviet P-15 Termit anti-ship missile used in the 1960s had a range of 40 kilometers. Meanwhile, RBS-15 missiles used in Poland now can be used against targets located up to 200 kilometers away. Approaching the attacked vessels becomes unnecessary. Paradoxically, on waters such as the Bal- tic Sea, large vessels are advantageous. The range of radars and other sensors embedded on a frigate places the frig- ates way above any patrol vessels, mis- sile boats of corvettes. Take the Ade- laide-class frigates as an example. These Australian vessels were to be acquired by the Polish Navy last year. Without a success, unfortunately. Their radars had maximum range exceeding 400 kilome- ters while the anti aircraft systems had a range of up to 160 kilometers.Assets as such make it possible to create a high definition situational picture. Radars and passive observation assets are also car- ried by embarked helicopters and UAVs. These sensors allow the frigate to re- main aware of what is happening with- in a radius of hundreds of kilometers. When placed in the geopolitical context in which Poland is embedded, the above means that if a frigate is located 50NM north of Rozewie, it would be capable of monitoring the air picture over the whole southern part of the Baltic Sea, reaching out to the entrance of the Gulf of Finland. This is, obviously, quite meaningful in the peacetime too. It is a vital interest of Poland to own most accurate and most up to date knowledge on what is happen- ing around us. This awareness cannot be provided by land-based systems, as their range is limited by the fact that they are located within the territory of Poland. Furthermore, it needs to be noted that Poland has no airborne surveillance/early warning assets at its disposal. The ca- pabilities of naval aviation are also quite limited. Furthermore, aircraft are not always capable providing 24/7 coverage in the given location, especially when we are speaking of a longer operational timeline. One should also be aware of the fact that the Baltic Sea, even though it is mediterranean and enclosed, is a subject to legal regulations applicable to any oth- er water body. Consequently, the vessels are free to move outside the territorial waters. In case of crises this has a rel- evant meaning – as there is a possibility to conduct reconnaissance without any legal restrictions.Capable sensors and effectors also translate into ability of the warships to play another role: they are a relevant element of force posture, as frigate is good means of force pro- jection. Thus, it is possible for a frigate to be used as an element of naval task groups. For instance, if Poland decided to support Baltic states in a crisis, or to intensify the operations undertaken by ELINT vessels, frigate escort would relevantly increase the effectiveness of such operations. Such protection cannot be provided by smaller vessels such as missile boats or patrol vessels as they, themselves, would need to be protected. The necessity to provide such escort has been exemplified in case of the US Navy's Pueblo unarmed spy ship taken over by the North Korean Navy back in the day. The need to provide escort and defense is even more pronounced in new hybrid war/conventional conflict scenarios. One should note that the potential adversary will take numerous steps to avoid or make it impossible for the allies to unan- imously react to the emerging crisis. Hybrid war in the maritime domain may take on a form of sabotage or fake ter- rorism against ships and infrastructure. It may seem that in case as such, use of patrol vessels (operated by the Navy or the Border Guard, alongside the MCM- Vs - that will be a subject of a separate article) would be sufficient. In some cas- es, special operations component could be employed as well. However, forces as such could be employed should conditions permit. If that is impossible, conditions shall be created for such forces to op- erate. One shall be aware of the fact that "hybrid" warfare is aimed at creat- ing conditions that would only become a favorable catalyst for using convention- al forces. Potential crisis involving ter- rorists could become a prelude to use of warships and the air force. Russia, referred to by NATO as the "potential adversary", would probably be trying to prove that Poland remains unable to control the situation in the Baltic region, in its zone of economic influence or even on its territorial waters. Czapla-Class patrol-vessel with mine hunting function that was one of the planned acquisitions in the past or the existing Ślązak OPV, NAVY