Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1193118
armed only with guns and MANPADS, would not be able to operate effective- ly in conditions as such. Same applies to mine countermeasure forces. The Border Guard would be in dire straits as well, as its vessels are armed solely with PKM machine guns. And use force is not even necessary – patrol vessels or Border Guard boats would not need to be sunk. Media and psychological dimension come into play here. Low passes of Russian aircraft over the US destroyers in the Baltic and in the Black Sea did not cause any significant effect. Same applies to the fake news suggesting that a single jet was able to jam all of the systems onboard the US destroyer. Even somebody that has no actual subject-matter know-how could have noticed that we are speaking about large, well-equipped and armed vessels. The situation would be a bit different when a patrol vessel is used to replace a large warship with significant armament onboard. Any scenario in which aircraft or vessels approach the Navy's assets creates an opportunity of using incidents as such as means to disseminate propa- ganda, in a form of photos or video-clips. Aggressive behavior or maneuvering would amplify the effect. It would be easy then to convince the society that any use of force could possibly lead to a massacre involving the crews of those vessels. Then, treating those sailors as hostages one may inspire the public to in- flict pressure on the government, so that the authorities make steps in line with the interest of the foreign nations. All of that: without firing a single bullet. The situation would be very much dif- ferent: politics-, military- and repu- tation-wise; should vessels offering greater and realistic potential be used, remaining capable of performing their own show of force. The capabilities of those vessels would need to be account- ed for in scenarios assuming an open confrontation. Light surface assets do not really meet this condition. The first factor that comes into play here is their inability to stay for longer periods in the area of interest at sea (2-3 weeks for instance). On the other hand, apart from anti-ship missiles, vessels as such do not really possess relevant combat capabili- ties. They would need protection provid- ed by the fighter aircraft. This is trouble- some, as the Polish geopolitical position, should crisis and war break out, would burden the fighters with numerous mis- sions and tasks. Self-defense and ability to protect other vessels would both be troublesome. This is conditioned by lim- ited range of effectors that can be in- tegrated on patrol vessels, missile boats or corvettes. The enemy may plan his air and naval operations in a way that would place his assets outside the range of the aforesaid vessels – so that they are simply evaded. As anti-aircraft missiles that could be integrated on those ves- sels have limited range of up to 10 NM, proper flight planning and modification of the routes in an ongoing manner are a task that is quite easy to accomplish. There is no effort that the adversary needs to make. If destruction of those assets would be required, then the cost, considering the number of weapons and platforms used for that purpose, would be close to naught. Quantitatively and qualitatively weak air defenses make it possible to employ obsolete, legacy mis- siles and carrier platforms, and these obsolete assets would be sufficient to accomplish that flight. As no area air de- fense is provided in a scenario as such, the risk of losing the MRCA is low, as the aircraft would launch their missiles be- fore appearing on the radar screens of smaller vessels. Saturation engagement will be easier – here the cheaper, legacy weapons can also be employed. We also cannot hope that the situation would permit those vessels to stay close to the shore. The shape of the Polish coastline makes it impossible to hide the surface combatants between the islands or in the bays. If that is not enough, states that remain able to use tactics as such (Denmark, Sweden, Finland) are taking steps towards acquiring vessels that would be larger and better armed with anti-aircraft systems. Finland serves as a perfect example of departure from the trend to use small missile boats. It may seem that Finland, with its compli- cated and convoluted coastline full of straits and islands, shall remain faithful to small missile boats. Especially in the light of the fact that the Finnish Navy has well-equipped Hamina-class vessels at its disposal. However, the strategic anal- ysis that takes scenarios different that coastal defense operations into account pushed the Finnish Navy towards acqui- sition of four large corvettes (Squadron 2020 program), armed with anti-aircraft missiles (RIM-162 Evolved Sea Spar- row), anti-ship missiles (Gabriele V) and sea mines. A multi-role vessel has been obtained, with displacement close to 4,000 t. Meaning of the matters and issues discussed above extends beyond the military domain. Politically, a country the armed forces of which cannot face the aggressor in an effective manner is weak, to say the least. This also applies to allied operations. It is necessary to act as a partner who is able to provide quantifiable military contribution – also in the form of warships. One cannot use the myth of size of the vessel that would be too large to operate on the waters of the Baltic Sea as a valid argument any- more. Any element that would come from the allies will have a high political price tag. This becomes even more evident, considering the fact that we would have a weaker position assuming a "needy" role. This will also have consequences after the conflict comes to an end. The history shows that only those who had a relevant and real impact on the fighting may have something to say in the peace negotiations. This factor is often over- looked when considerations are being made as to what equipment is needed by the Polish military, Polish Navy included. What vessels should be acquired by the Polish MoD then, considering all of the factors listed above? It is clear for sure, as to what warships we do not need. Keeping the small missile boats alive is somewhat unnecessary. This creates a large question-mark associated with the Murena program and modernization of the Orkan-class corvettes. "ORP Jelcz" - land-based NSM missile batteries [on the Jelcz trucks, hence the jokingly as- cribed name] of the Naval Missile Unit, seem to be the best "missile vessel" ca- pable of controlling the Baltic Sea. These assets are cheaper to procure and main- tain, yet, they are also capable of acting against threats in the southern part of the Baltic Sea, operating from the shore. When it comes to the warships them- selves, frigates are the most promising direction here, provided that Poland de- cides to spend proper money on those. They may be referred to as large cor- vettes or coastal defense vessels. Re- gardless of the terminology, there is a specific set of features that are desirable in case of the new surface combatants. Primarily, they shall remain capable of providing area air/missile defense. This can be achieved by equipping those ves- sels with surface-to-air missiles with a range exceeding 150 kilometers. Add- ing a second type of missiles of shorter www.fragoutmag.com