Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1220268
an unnecessary risk. The losses would be easy to rectify, in a rapid manner. High value assets would be the only per- missible targets for kinetic operations: valuable, costly to procure and difficult to replace. These could include long range air defense systems, AE&W air- craft, electronic warfare assets, com- mand stations, communication nodes and associated personnel and other tar- gets of similar sort. PsyOps shall also be an important component of the under- taken activities, influencing the posture adopted by persons remaining under oc- cupation, making collaborationism an un- attractive option. Finally, forces staying within the area controlled by the enemy would also be the obvious, relevant, or even exclusive source of intelligence. Relevant problems may also emerge at levels higher than tactical. One should suspect that should Poland be occupied, attempt would be made to establish an alternative government structure sub- ordinated to the occupying state, with collaborating government and adminis- trative structures also being created. The occupying nation would make use of the existing divisions and conflicts to gain endorsement and support, or at least obedience in case of some of the members of the society. In a scenario that would be extreme, in which Poland could not count on the allies, support for a war could be limited. The only situation in which irregular warfare would be an option is the one in which Poland is partially and temporarily occupied. Then the irregular warfare would be reasonable from the point of view of population staying within the occupied zone, and from the point of view of the soldiers as well. Keeping at least a part of the territory under control and coop- eration with the allies would allow Po- land to create relatively safe foundation for the guerrilla warfare forces – for instance in the C2 domain. Short-term occupation would also mean that the scale of repression would be limited, territory-wise to say the least. These factors raise the chance to carry out operations effectively. In circum- stances as such, the forces involved in irregular warfare, planning them or working in isolation, would be able to co- ordinate their effort with the operation- al activities of the regular forces. Then the irregular warfare elements would be tasked to coordinate their operations with the main forces. This would involve recon and JTAC or pro- viding CASEVAC and CSAR. Then the irregular warfare would also concern a different spectrum of targets. Compo- nents important from the point of view of conventional warfare would become the critical targets here, even at the cost of high losses among the irregular forces. This can translate into detection and engagement of targets such as radars, electronic warfare assets, air defense systems or long-range artillery. All of that effort shall be coordinated with the main portion of the undertaken opera- tional activities. These assets have the greatest impact on the activities under- taken during the conflict as a whole. If targets as such are undetected and still active, the operational elements (regu- lar units) could suffer from significant losses, and thus lose the war, at tactical and operational level as well. On the oth- er hand, one shall remember that assets as the ones listed above would be heavi- ly protected by the enemy, and relevant countermeasures would be put in place to act against the irregular operations. This means that risk of losses is high and activities as such require a meticulous calculation to be carried out with re- gards to potential gains and losses. Meanwhile, however, should irregular warfare be subordinated to the regular forces, they could, in a very relevant manner, amplify the efforts undertaken by the regular units. These activities will have a complementary nature, as they would, most probably, be focused on re- connaissance. Kinetic attack would only be probable in case of HVAs and targets worthy of engagement. www.fragoutmag.com