Frag Out! Magazine

Frag Out! Magazine #31

Frag Out! Magazine

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would be getting their enemy invested in the fight, at least at the early stage of the conflict. Using the special operations component of the Revolutionary Guards Corps could be yet another way that Iran may use to act against the US infrastructure, troops, and diplomats. Attacks as such could be potentially executed outside the Middle East. Here, terrorists of the groups supported by Iran (Lebanese Hezbollah) could be tasked with acts as such. These acts may be (or even have already been) planned and prepared in advance. It is difficult to define how attacks as such, targeted against military assets and personnel, would be effective. Two factors come into play here. First - since the two decades of the war on terror, major advancements have been made when it comes to means of security used to protect the infrastructure. Similar progress has been made in the domain of intel gathering, on the potential threats and ways one could use to react to acts of terror. Secondly, US society has been very sensitive to the matter of loss of life. This was visible during the intervention in Lebanon, back in 1983. However, after 9/11 we could have witnessed a shift in the attitude of society. A large scale attack (as the one launched back then - which is not a probable scenario) may not inspire fear and terror, it would rather be a source of rage. Summing it up - even a brief, shallow analysis of a hypothetical armed conflict makes it possible for us to indicate the factors that are decisive for the result. In the 21st Century, the technological advantage plays a key role, and it pertains both to the situational awareness (sensors), as well as the process of neutralizing the threat (effectors). It is fairly difficult to catch up with the more advanced states within that scope, even when non-tangible assets, such as morale or fanaticism, come into play. Potentially, it would be a sad last war for the Tomcats. Most probably it would create an image of heroic pilots flying aircraft that have their good days far behind. Some cases of tactical success would not have any impact on the outcome. This is the most important lesson learned, also for analytical processes related to other, potential conflicts around the world. ANALYSIS

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