Frag Out! Magazine

Frag Out! Magazine #32

Frag Out! Magazine

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A LT I T U D E : 2 7 5 0 M T A R G E T L O C K : O N T A R G E T I N R A N G E : 1 2 5 6 7 M T A R G E T D I S T: 2 5 0 8 M data on the losses: 170 MBTs were lost, with some of them being taken over by Azer- baijan. Other assets were also irrecoverably damaged. Should the war continue, for a few more days, the Azeri side could potentially suc- ceed in cutting off the Nagorno-Karabakh exclave from Armenia. Azerbaijan could then, potentially, attempt to take over the area. Possibly, they could also take over control over the corridor that leads to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. However, these possibilities need to be considered in the political dimension, not the military one. The diplomatic importance of the steps tak- en has also been supported by the tangible force element - the mechanized brigade, the deployment of which was prepared before- hand. This is an act of Russian intervention, with Moscow saving its ally facing a crisis. The Russians did that to protect their inter- est as well. Hypothetically speaking, should the offen- sive actions continue, Russia could poten- tially get involved in the war on the Armenian side. This, consequently, could worsen the Russia-Turkey relationship, with Turkey sup- porting Azerbaijan. A scenario as such would be a worse case - both for Turkey, as well as for Russia. Ankara could get its military assets involved in the conflict. Furthermore, it could also block the strategic Black Sea straits, limiting the Russian Navy's freedom of maneuver in the area, not to mention the potential dissolution of the military procure- ment contracts signed between Ankara and Moscow. The vision of a new Russian-Turkish war would not be a probable scenario here though. This would mean that Turkey, with its relationship with the West being already complicated, would open a new field of con- flict, without any allies to provide support. The fact that the war ended up in another agreement suspending the conflict - as the main cause, namely the dispute over Na- gorno-Karabakh, has not been resolved - is also desired by both Russia and Turkey. Both the Armenians, as well as the Azeri side, would depend on the Russians, controlling the corridors. The Armenian dependence on Russia is becoming greater, with Moscow acting as an entity capable of providing secu- rity in the region, stopping Azerbaijan. This is even more pronounced, given the losses incurred already. Azerbaijan itself would still depend on Turkey, even though the freedom of armed action has been limited. Turkey would still be supporting the Azeri side in the military and intelligence domains though. When it comes to politics and strategy, an- other two important factors appeared here. The first one stems from the ineffective na- ture of the Armenian soft power. There were some steps made, referring to the activism undertaken by the large diaspora, to gain at- tention and support from the Western pub- lic sphere. For instance, System of a Down, a well-known band with musicians having Armenian roots, has recorded a propaganda song, and a video clip. The above, and other forms of activism (that could even have been noticed in the Polish military-focused Inter- net sphere) did not have any tangible impact on the Caucasus, as the events unfolding did not gain any attention in the Western public sphere. With the world fighting the pandem- ic, the West has been viewing Azerbaijan and Armenia as exotic eastern states, without any specific associations that could make the Western public opinion demand actions being taken by the state actors. The United States has also skipped the opportunity to get involved more deeply, with their modest role being limited to negotiating a single, yet unstable, ceasefire agreement. No other means were employed - such as sanctions for instance. No significant signs of activity have been seen after November 10th. This proves that either the Trump administration concluded that the region is controlled by Moscow anyway, or the decision-making authority concerning this conflict in a sen- sitive region has been exhausted, due to the internal problems. It is possible that the US authorities, having the election and the pan- demic on their shoulders, were simply unable to take action, apart from a single attempt aimed at maintaining the status quo. Military-wise, the conflict has been an inter- esting one for the external observers. Azer- baijan has been able to establish an effective strike system utilizing UAVs, both in the rec- ce, as well as in the combat role. The UAV inventory of the Azeri side also included the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 UAS - which gained most of the media attention. The systems worked with loitering munitions - such as the Israeli Harop, Orbiter-1K, or SkyStriker systems. Ballistic missiles - LORA and Toch- ka-U, and rocket artillery were used as well. The system also included tube artillery, and Spike ER, and Spike NLOS ATGMs. An-2 air- craft procured in China were converted to act as target decoys. ANALYSIS

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