Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1407740
A LT I T U D E : 2 7 5 0 M TA R G E T L O C K : O N TA R G E T I N R A N G E : 1 2 5 6 7 M TA R G E T D I S T: 2 5 0 8 M a Down, a well-known band with musicians having Armenian roots, has recorded a propaganda song, and a video clip. The above, and other forms of activ- ism (that could even have been noticed in the Polish military-focused Internet sphere) did not have any tangible impact on the Caucasus, as the events un- folding did not gain any attention in the Western public sphere. With the world fighting the pandemic, the West has been viewing Azerbaijan and Armenia as exotic eastern states, without any specific asso- ciations that could make the Western public opinion demand actions being taken by the state actors. The United States has also skipped the opportunity to get involved more deeply, with their modest role being limited to negotiating a single, yet unstable, ceasefire agreement. No other means were em- ployed - such as sanctions for instance. No signifi- cant signs of activity have been seen after Novem- ber 10th. This proves that either the Trump admin- istration concluded that the region is controlled by Moscow anyway, or the decision-making authority concerning this conflict in a sensitive region has been exhausted, due to the internal problems. It is possible that the US authorities, having the election and the pandemic on their shoulders, were simply unable to take action, apart from a single attempt aimed at maintaining the status quo. Military-wise, the conflict has been an interesting one for the external observers. Azerbaijan has been able to establish an effective strike system utilizing UAVs, both in the recce, as well as in the combat role. The UAV inventory of the Azeri side also includ- ed the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 UAS - which gained most of the media attention. The systems worked with loitering munitions - such as the Israeli Harop, Orbiter-1K, or SkyStriker systems. Ballistic mis- siles - LORA and Tochka-U, and rocket artillery were used as well. The system also included tube artillery, and Spike ER, and Spike NLOS ATGMs. An-2 aircraft procured in China were converted to act as target decoys. The mass use of loitering munitions is fairly inter- esting (UAVs fitted with warheads, being capable of spending up to a couple of hours over the battlefield, searching for valuable targets, in a mixed strike-re- connaissance role). Furthermore, contrary to con- ventional cruise missiles, the loitering munitions are recoverable, should they be unable to detect the targets. Therefore, systems as such can be used in a dual recce-strike role. This set of capabilities comes close to what is offered by MRCA. Given the modest quantity of air assets that Azerbaijan had at its disposal, the UAVs have become a substitute for manned aviation assets, also being cheaper, and making it possible to avoid loss of life. Although Armenians have been using a variety of air defense assets (including the S-300P and self-propelled Tor and Osa-AK/AKM), they were still unable to defend themselves from the airstrikes. The air defense system has been penetrable. For instance, the Tor systems have not been deployed to the frontline most probably. Plausibly, the sys- tems were not combat-ready, or the Armenians wanted to save them, should the conflict reach the territory of the state. The elements of the S-300 SAM - launchers and radars - were subjected to several UAV/ballistic missile strikes. Osa SAMs were being eliminated at stand-off distance by UAVs carrying guided bombs and by loitering munitions. These strikes, most probably, were also supported by SIGINT and electronic warfare assets. The Aze- ri side, therefore, could have been viewed as the one that had gained air superiority in the area. The quantity, quality, and variety of measures that were used to neutralize the air defenses, as well as the fact that no IAMD system was present on the Ar- menian side both facilitated the process of neutral- ization of the Armenian air defenses. The individual assets did not provide mutual support among them- selves. This left the destruction of the Osa-AK/AKM SAMs being virtually unpunished. Gaining air superiority here allowed Azerbaijan to act against the Armenian artillery and ballistic mis- sile launchers. UAVs were also employed to engage MBTs, but in a manner that could be viewed as un- conventional. Both the large Bayrakrar, as well as the smaller Israeli drones are not carrying typical anti-tank warheads. Intermediary methods were used, aimed at inflicting unrepairable damage - for instance, the drones were attacking the engine compartments of the MBTs. The damaged vehicles were immobilized. Even though potential recovery operations have been possible, the vehicles were being often abandoned by the crews thus being eliminated from the battle. Then these MBTs were being attacked again, or they were being taken over by the Azeri forces. UAVs were also used to attack infantry - either directly, or by directing the artillery fire. In the case of infantry, or light vehicles - the Armenian side suffered from significant losses. The domination of the unmanned platforms and the losses impacting the armored assets created some doubts among the experts, who were ques- tioning the future of the MBT on the future battle- field. Undoubtedly, having a look at the recordings depicting the Armenian T-72 MBTs being attacked from above, one could conclude that the MBT era has come to an end. This is a methodological fallacy since solely recordings of successful strikes have been shared. The broader context is not being taken into account, should this mindset be adopted. Above all, it needs to be accounted for, that MBTs, thanks to their armor and active means of protection that are becoming more, and more common, are becom- ing increasingly more resilient to attacks as such. Secondly, the UAV tactics were effective, due to the lack of lethal abilities on the part of the Arme- 25 www.fragoutmag.com ANALYSIS