Frag Out! Magazine
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border separately, and ready them for use on-site. One should take into account the fact that the warhead is the only sen- sitive component. The fuselage, wings, stabilizers, or electronics are far easier to transport. In the case of the coastal infrastructure, the drones may also take off from ships posing as merchant ships/ cruise ships. Furthermore, aircraft as such may have a range of several kilome- ters. The attack may begin far away from the target, thus it would be far easier to conceal the preparatory stage - atypical activities may not be associated with an attack against a quite distant facility. The hybrid threats may also involve the use of conventional weapons. In an event of an international crisis, an escalation may take place, to allow for de-escalation that would follow a scenario beneficial for one of the parties involved. If a crisis in- volved Russia and Poland, launching one salvo of cruise missiles (such as Kalibr) from warships of the Baltic Fleet, against the five largest powerplants in Poland, could have serious consequences, demon- strating the readiness to proceed with further actions. More importantly, as op- eration as such can be contained within a small timeframe, from the decision to the actual impact of the missiles, it has a specific territorial scope, and, what is even more important, would result in limited casualties, the area for diploma- cy would be far more expansive, than in case of a full scale, land invasion. A sin- gle strike would mean that a single-sided compromise could follow. However, fol- lowing a blow as such, the authorities of the attacked state could comply with the aforesaid compromise. In circumstances of a full-scale conflict, facilities and systems playing a key role for operational activities of the Armed Forces and of the state would be the pri- ority targets. This pertains, in particular, to the communication systems, as well as energy and transport infrastructure. One shall remember that not every facil- ity or system relevant during a conflict is viewed as critical infrastructure and another way round. It may turn out that some of the elements of the critical infra- structure so important for the function- ing of the society, maybe less relevant when a crisis or armed conflict circum- stances emerge. Facilities that have a direct impact on the capabilities of the military would be considered crucial here. This differentiation also translates into diverse requirements, when it comes to ensuring security and defending the el- ements of critical infrastructure. During peacetime, the threat posed by com- mercially available UAVs can be mitigat- ed in a couple of ways. The aviation law alone makes it possible to designate ar- eas where flying is prohibited, or limited, where a permit needs to be obtained for overflights. Furthermore, flights of UAVs over harbors and ports, power plants, water intakes, wastewater treatment plants, military areas, and military train- ing ranges, can only take place when au- thorized by, or done for the party respon- sible for the given facility. The prohibition alone would not deter those willing to breach it. However, the limitations, including the requirement to obtain a permit, make it possible to iden- tify the threat more easily. However, this is only possible when the security service at the given facility can detect and re- spond to a threat as such. Should an attack happen, the legal regu- lations in force allow the guards and se- curity service to take over control of the UAV (soft kill), or to simply shoot it down (hard kill). An obvious question is, wheth- er, and how (also, equipment-wise), the (immediate) physical safeguarding/secu- rity staff working at the facility/premises are prepared to handle such a threat. One should also take into account the fact that due to the threat profile (small drones capable of delivering small pay- load), it may turn out that in the case of some facilities, the reaction should be the main focus, instead of prevention. In other cases, any deployment of expansive drone detection and neutralization meas- ures would be justified.n The situation is quite different when it comes to hybrid warfare. The assets used to conduct an offensive action are far more complex and technologically ad- vanced, with the potential damage also being far more serious. One shall assume then that the most threatened objects - energy and transport infrastructure in particular - shall be covered by extra security measures, at least during the crises. Again, facilities in Poland that shall receive extra protection include the biggest power plants - in Bełchatów, Kozienice, Jaworzno, Opole, or Rybnik, and combined heat and power plants www.fragoutmag.com