Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1517379
in Romania. Hence, typically, the first step taken when an unidentified aircraft is detected is the ATC tries to establish communications and send relevant instructions to the crew. The second step that may occur is a scramble, with fighters intercepting the intruder. According to the statutory defini- tion coming from the Act on Protection of the State Border, an „Intercept involves identification of a foreign military aircraft, establishing of radio communications and visual contact, and guiding it in the right direction, or to the right altitude, or forcing it to land on the designated airfield". The intercept may be done by Polish military aircraft helicopters, or allied assets tasked with air policing. Identification of the intruder, and establishing radio communications and visual contact play a key role here. This makes it possible to obtain accurate IDs and proper assessment of the situation. The lack of established com- munications may stem from numerous reasons, including systems failure, or other crises. If the intercepted intruder turns out to be a civil airplane, whose pilot lost communica- tions or spatial orientation, helping him in finding the right route or bringing him down to the suitable runway should be enough. The use of weapons is the last resort, even in light of the recently changed legal regulations. The changes in the Act on Protection of the State Border introduced in September 2023, define several procedures for intercepting aircraft. The first one applies to foreign, military aircraft that, once intercepted, may be warned by warning shots. If that does not work, they can be destroyed. Furthermore, there is no obligation to intercept or fire warn- ing shots, if the foreign military aircraft attacks the territo- ry of the Republic of Poland, maneuvers into a position to engage, or carries out a reconnaissance sortie preceding, and aimed and making such engagement possible. The de- cision on the use of those means is made by the Operational Commander of the Armed Forces unless the intruder en- gages first or a loss of communication occurs. Then, deci- sion-making authority is placed in the hands of the pilot in command of the aircraft that makes the intercept. The situation is different, when the intruder is a civilian airplane or helicopter, conducting a flight without authori- zation of the Polish ATC. Then, it may be identified as sus- pected, possible, or confirmed „renegade" - if that status is indeed confirmed, the aircraft could be destroyed, should it be certain that it would be used as a tool in an act of terror. However, the obvious condition that needs to be met, for that scenario to unfold, is the circumstance in which just the perpetrators remain onboard. No procedure exists allowing for the downing of an aircraft with passengers as hostages. The third procedure is applicable, when it comes to spe- cific types of threats - namely, missiles. As these cannot be intercepted and identified by the jets that are usually scrambled, while the radar signature of a missile such as the Iskander is unique enough and distinguishable from an airliner, using that procedure one can proceed to the pro- cess of neutralizing the threat by IADS, which includes naval and land missile defense systems operated by the Polish Armed Forces, and NATO elements protecting the Polish territory. However, in this case, the decision to neutralize the missile that is viewed as a potential threat is also made by the Operational Commander. The fourth procedure is applied when the threat is posed by a UAV that violated the border, and conducts a sortie in the Polish airspace, also violating the legal regulations in force. Aircraft as such may be destroyed, or incapacitated, control may also be taken over, so that it lands at a desired location. Here, the legal regulations do not specifically mention interceptor scramble, as the UAVs may come in all forms (DJI Phantom, Geran-2, or even an unmanned Tu-143 platform - with performance and dimensions comparable to a small military jet). The scope of means that can be used here is broad, from small arms, counter-UAS solutions, and air defense assets, to military aircraft. For that reason and in this case (and this is exclusive for this scenario), the Operational Commander may decide to intercept or destroy the UAV, but this competency may be delegated to the sub- ordinated commander, thus shortening the decision-making chain. The existing procedures are just a small part of the whole equation. To apply the procedures, we need to know what we're dealing with. Hence, in some extreme cases, like a trike involving ballistic Iskander missiles, it would be neces- sary to always scramble fighters to find out whether some- thing is a jet, cruise missile, or a UAV. And to do that, one needs time. Furthermore, even visual identification alone does not solve the problem. The decision to shoot down a foreign air threat, apart from the object being destroyed, also entails www.fragoutmag.com