Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1517379
Article text: MikoĊaj Susujew Images Credit:Marcin Ogdowski For most of the Western, and global experts, the Spring of 2022 was a puzzling surprise, with the Armed For- ces of Ukraine stopping the Russians in the battle of Kiev, and pushing the aggressor away from the capital, and other northern regions of the country. This is not the result expected by most of the analysts. No wonder. A compari- son of raw data was pointing to a major disproportion of potential, and it was simply logical to assume the Russians would win. Any computer software de- signed for the purpose of wargaming, acting as an impartial analyst, would probably reach an identical result. Po- litical decisions made by the West befo- re the war overtly suggested expecta- tions as such. And that was happening in countries with the most significant intel-gathering potential around. Undo- ubtedly, it is true that the scenario de- parted from what had been expected. But it is also a result of Russian negli- gence and Moscow's ability to create the potential appearance of strength when no strength existed. The Rus- sians have been imitating the military capabilities skillfully in many areas. No- wadays, this is clear, back then, these tactics were difficult to spot. There is one more piece of the equation here that was overlooked - the underesti- mated capabilities possessed by the Ukrainians. Only a fusion of these two factors led to circumstances in which, following 600 days of war, we are di- scussing a frontline deadlock, instead of dwelling on the effectiveness of Ukra- inian guerilla warfare in the western part of the country. The present article aims to scrutinize where Ukrainian resilience comes from. Specifically, I want to examine how the Ukrainians managed, during 8 years of war in the east, to reform their armed forces to the extent that made it pos- sible to stop the Russian blitzkrieg in 2022. What made it possible for the mi- litary that was unable to deploy 10,000 combat-ready troops in the spring of 2014, when the soldiers had been mass surrendering, to become Armed Forces ready to face the adversary in combat and fight him even when encircled (as happened in the case of the Mariupol garrison, that was cut off and encircled in a dire battle). Referring to reforms and changes that led to a rebirth of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the author will not be focusing on the procurement of new assets, or the restructuring process (technicalities), as these have been more-or-less already discussed. Instead, the present article would ad- dress the matters that are laid beneath this, namely the social and political di- mensions. The author wants to discuss the changes happening in Ukraine itself, as of 2014, and the impact those chan- ges had on the transformation of the military that, in any state, is a repli- cation of the state in which the given society, and state, remain. Context. The situation in Ukraine in 2014. We need to start by understanding the situation in which Ukraine found itself back in 2014. To understand the chan- ges, we need to understand the context, and the starting point for the Ukrainian military, when a decision was made to implement the relevant changes. Ukraine inherited a well-armed and lar- ge military from the USSR, along with huge munitions and weapons stockpi- les. As a Soviet republic, Ukraine was a critical logistics hub for the potential Army of Transitional Period. PART 1 How the Ukrainians managed to reform their Armed Forces post-2014, in anticipation of the full-scale Russian aggression? www.fragoutmag.com