Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1517379
WWIII southern front. Independent Ukraine made an erroneous assumption - thinking no direct adversaries surro- unded the border, Kyiv decided that it was not necessary to maintain power- ful Armed Forces. Ever since 1991, Ukraine has been introducing qualitati- ve and quantitative cuts in its military power, in varied domains. Large quan- tities of weapons and armament came from the storage, and the liquidated units were sold by Ukraine. This has placed the country at the top of the global arms trade rankings for years. As we know, Ukraine also got rid of its nuclear weapons. This decision was dic- tated by a conclusion Kyiv reached: it would be unable, finances-wise, to cre- ate its own system for managing the strategic nuclear forces, that would be independent of Russia, and thus it wo- uld be unable to maintain those forces. In exchange for that Ukraine received certain economic benefits from Russia. The disarming process was actively supported by Western partners who financed the decommissioning of nume- rous weapons systems. The West was also blind when it came to the Russian threat, and this situation remained valid until the 2014 invasion. Even tho- ugh almost all Ukrainian governments participated in the process, the 2010- 2014 term of office, with pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych in power, was the most prominent one within that scope. Dmitriy Lebedyev, the last of the Ukra- inian Ministers of Defense, before the shift of power happened, was a Russian citizen, and he fled to Moscow when Yanukovych stepped down. Lebedyev planned to implement significant cuts in the Armed Forces, along with struc- tural reduction - supposedly aimed at modernization. Soviet-made weapons systems had to be decommissioned, and the new, small army had to be quic- kly modernized. In practical terms, the above simply translated to reduction. The government was not planning to si- gnificantly increase the defence expen- diture, following the quantitative cuts. If the plan succeeded, Ukraine would effectively lose the potential to restore the capabilities of the Armed Forces, as the structures expected to be ready to take the first Russian blow would be non-existent, and there would be a need to create them from the ground up. Lebedyev simply did not manage to implement those plans, as the Maidan revolution of 2013-2014 was a symp- tom that Yanukovych's days were soon to be over. This was a blow, after which never could the pro-Russian side hope to return to power in Ukraine. Despite that, during Yanukovych's term of office, the Ukrainian military suf- fered from major losses already. The logistics were dismantled. Heavy tube and rocked artillery assets, and some air defense systems started to be de- commissioned. The military units were formed in a territorial manner, prima- rily to cut costs. During the events of Spring 2014, in Crimea, this had a detrimental impact on the Ukrainian si- tuation. In general, in early 2014 the Armed Forces of Ukraine were in agony. The officers' corps consisted of people with „Soviet school" roots, and some who mentally were aligned with Russia, rather than Ukraine. Some officers per- ceived the military service as a method to get rich, making use of total cor- ruption, omnipresent at all levels, from the top to the very bottom. Persons driven by patriotism, or continuing the family professional military tradition were a minority here. The number of people assigned to the units was mi- nimal, making it impossible to maintain even minimum mobilization capabilities, in the event of a war. The HR structure was ruined, and there were no finan- ces available at hand, to maintain the readiness of equipment. The number of exercises was kept at a bare mini- mum, and if training happened it usually pertained to the lower-tier units, such as platoons or companies. Higher level exercises simply were not taking place for years. Air-mobile units and Spet- snaz regiments were the only elements that had higher levels of training, and more people at hand. The situation was also tragic in the Air Force, air defen- se units, and the Navy. One could risk a statement that it was even worse. Neither the Air Force, nor the Navy can exist, without well-trained personnel, and well-maintained equipment. And that status was impossible to achieve, due to the chronic lack of financing for the Armed Forces as a whole, and for the individual elements. And this is the state in which the Rus- sian invader found the Ukrainian military in 2014. The active approach adopted by Russia in Crimea, and rapid, fast operation in February and March 2014 were a surprise for the Ukrainians. Once Yanukovych fled to Russia, Kyiv was in chaos, due to the vacuum in the power department. The new government was being formed, following the decision made by the Parliament. And the new team was isolated from Kyiv, with its decisions being disrespected, or overtly sabotaged by the regional authorities. The power structure in regions inheri- ted from Yanukovych's mafia state was not quick to accept the changes in Kyiv. That chaos and uncertainty also had a major impact on the state services, including the Armed Forces. Nobody knew who could, and who could not be trusted. Out of three groups of officers listed above, the first one was overtly surrendering to, or joining the Russians in the event of a confrontation. This was the case for the newly appointed Navy commander, Admiral Berezovsky, who joined the Russian side a day after his appointment. Then, during the Rus- sian invasion, he was actively encoura- ging the Ukrainian soldiers and officers to surrender and join the Russians. And numerous officers like him served in the Armed Forces of Ukraine at the time. Many officers belonging to the second category did not want to risk their he- alth or lives and were leaving the army in mass numbers. The times, when pe- aceful, corruption-driven office time dominated the weekly schedule were gone. The Ukrainian military had a dan- gerous era ahead, with the prospect of facing the Russian Armed Forces in an open confrontation. One could say that the Ukrainian Armed Forces went thro- ugh a natural purge in this way. During the Crimean crisis, most of the Ukrainian military units fell back to their isolated bases, not even trying to ac- tively resist the Russians. The gover- nment in Kyiv was frequently criticized for failing to resist, or to even try to do so. This is perceived as cowardness and indecisiveness. However, not only wo- uld any action fail, but it would also be embarrassing - with orders being igno- red, or leading to treason. The minority of patriotism-driven soldiers stationed in Crimea would not have been able to do much, when the majority of their col- leagues were locals, with their families living in cities and towns fully contro- lled by the Russians at the time. Fur- thermore, those soldiers were working subordinated to commanders either not ready to fight their „Russian bro- thers", or morally unprepared to fight and take risks. In this situation, using time to one's advantage was the only option - to buy time to gather forces big enough to defend the remainder of the Ukrainian territory from a potential offensive action. The Ukrainian gover- ANALYSIS