Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1517379
in Donbas. The Armed Forces needed time to prepare. High-readiness units were the first ones deployed to the region. These included elements of some SOF units, and airborne brigades and regiments. At the same time, to block the biggest, and the most dangerous of the Russian sabota- ge units, commanded by Strelkov, special units of National Guard and SBU were deployed, with some support provided by regular units too. At the same time, the reservists were being mobilized. The au- thorities in Kyiv were in a rush to reple- nish the human resources structure of the regular units and deploy them to Donbas so that they could stabilize the situation by simply maintaining their presence the- re. Or so it seemed, at the time. It seemed that at this stage, it would be enough to block the area, preventing other groups from entering the Ukrainian territory. Mobilization was a staged process. First, people were called for duty in an accele- rated manner, to fill in the empty spaces at the recruitment stations - the process was aimed at finding those who would then seek the reservists. The mobilization stations and the system as a whole also suffered from cuts in the Yanukovych era. They were considered irrelevant, given the intent to establish small, professionali- zed armed forces. Later, the mobilization of the reservists who had served in the Ukrainian, or even Soviet forces, began. It was quite easy to avoid mobilization since no sufficient time was available to revise and reform the recruitment system. Apart from the omnipresent corruption, the sys- tem was full of people who were less than loyal to Ukraine, thus sabotaging the mo- bilization. More of those people occupied the office spaces, and they were not that eager to serve in the frontline units. Thus, people who could not avoid military servi- ce, or who volunteered were actually re- cruited. The Ukrainian units were being sent east in small groups. When the newly established command was able to gather a single bat- talion, or a company of some brigade, fol- lowing a brief training it was immediately deployed east. Frontline, divided into a couple of areas of operations, was esta- blished in Donbas. Each AO had a command of its own. They were to handle the ele- ments of regular brigades, varying in size, Territorial Defense units, National Guard elements (that quickly militarized itself, forming operational regiments and briga- des capable of partaking in frontline bat- tles), and numerous volunteer units. One may imagine how difficult it was to coor- dinate untrained, not integrated elements, without any normal communication, and how challenging it was to establish logi- stics of any kind, in these circumstances. It seemed that the General Staff, planning the operations, was completely unaware of that status quo, since the Ukrainian command planned a grand, complicated en- circlement operation for that mix of units, aiming at keeping the Russians in cities, cut off from the border, with the resistan- ce expected to be quashed. That operation required everything that the Ukrainians did not have at the time. Primarily, good co- ordination, communications, supplies, and battle management. The operation also did not take into account the Russian Armed Forces openly countering the Ukrainian ac- tions. The Ukrainian brigades stayed away from the biggest of the Donbas cities and entered the narrow strip of land separa- ting those agglomerations from the bor- der. There, they were suffering from tube artillery strikes, and airstrikes, conduc- ted by the Russian forces, finding them- selves on the other side of the border. The Ukrainian blockade was interrupted by the Russian „volunteers", trained, armed, and sent to Donbas by the Russian Army, wave after wave. Towards the end of su- mmer, the Russian Army decided to bring that summer campaign to a conclusion and started a direct strike, involving regular Russian units. A couple of tactical batta- lion groups of different Russian airborne, armored, and mechanized units entered the Ukrainian territory. This strike made the situation entirely different. The Ukra- inian defensive effort fell apart, and now the Ukrainian units trying to encircle the Russian forces in the cities have been sur- rounded. Some of them surrendered, some fought their way out, and some simply ran away (if they had anywhere to go). This was the case for some of the Territorial Defense battalions who, facing well-armed Russian, regular units, were simply leaving their positions behind, and headed home in their entirety, returning to their origin regions. The famous raid of the 95th Air- borne-Assault Brigade and 30th Mecha- nized Brigade brought some relief, during that critical period - back then, these units were commanded by Col. (now General) Zabrotski. Elements of those brigades bro- ke the frontline (agreed frontline) in the Donetsk and Bakhmut regions, and appro- ached the border, destroying the Russian support elements, and the Russian rein- forcements sent to Donbas. These units also took the Saur-Mokhyl hill and secured a way out of the encirclement for several Ukrainian units. www.fragoutmag.com