Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1517379
Security of personnel and related to the personnel is equally important - that refers to risk management related to the persons who can legally access the given facility. Persons as such, whether employed based on contracts, as temporary contractors (dealing with renovation for in- stance), or persons rendering some kind of services, can all easily gather intelligence and may attempt to sabotage the operations. This would be much easier for them, than for third parties. The managing entity has the initiative here. First, security zones need to be designated, along with the rules applicable to the presence of foreign personnel within the facility (delivery people, couriers). The managing party should also act responsibly when it comes to the personnel on-site. An employee who receives good pay and who is professionally satisfied is an employee who would have no reason to start covertly acting detrimentally, bringing harm to his/her employer. Employees as such, additionally, would be eager to report any weird proposals or offers. Coming back to the actual means of "physical" securi- ty, for the critical infrastructure the obligation to employ security guards is placed on the owners who have a right to employ means envisaged by the Act on the Security of People and Property. Patrols or checkpoints manned by the security guards, technical means such as CCTV cameras, or sensors, alarm systems, and adequate barriers (fences and gates) may all be used within that scope. Meanwhile, the powers and cre- dentials the security guards are granted are identical as in the case of any other facility, including the right to determi- ne the right to remain within the given facility, the right to be shown ID, to establish the identity of the given person, and, finally, within legally-defined limits, the right to use coercion and firearms. These rules remain relatively narrow, and the power is very limited when compared to the police officers for instance. One of the problems is also related to detection and re- sponse to incidents outside of the limits of the protected facility. If anything suspicious is happening in the street, adjacent to the facility, the security guards are not allowed to check IDs or to inspect vehicles. Power as such is only granted to state service officers. Specific power is granted to the Railway Security Service (SOK), as its current legal status places it between a state police force and an internal security service. The SOK service is an exception to the rule. Hence the steps taken to create a narrow security zone around the LNG terminal - 200 meters wide. The Police and Border Guard officers have been tasked to enforce the related limits. In this case, the situation is specific, and tho- se rules apply just to that specific facility. In any other case, if the security guards note a worrying development, and intervention is needed, solely the Police or other relevant services can intervene. These organs usually handle nume- rous tasks, not limited to securing critical infrastructure. In a perfect world the presence (or lack thereof) of facilities requiring special security measures should be aligned with the Police HR structure in the individual regions. In practi- cal terms, however, even the Police regulations concerning the personnel assignment only consider simple factors, such as population, level of crime, or Voivodeship area. The said situation is derived from the fact that the legal regulations applicable to the provision of security measures for critical infrastructure have been born in times that have been far more peaceful. Adopting a simple assumption on division of tasks between a standing security team of the given facility, and the Police that only intervenes ad hoc, has been the obvious way to go. The anti-terrorist regula- tions did not change the rules here. Information exchange and issuance of binding recommendations by the Internal Security Agency (ABW) pertain to the information exchan- ge proper, not physical security. The situation is not that dire for the facilities that bear relevance for defense and security. According to the legal regulations in force, should mobilization be announced, mi- litarized units are formed, and tasked with guarding those facilities. Moreover, the legal regulations alone mention the possibility of the security service tasked with guarding Category I facilities by the military. As these regulations ap- ply to facilities significant for national defense and security, the security may be ensured by military units that are not fully equipped personnel-wise, during peacetime. From the point of view of an ordinary citizen, not every facility surrounded by a solid fence and guarded by secu- rity guards is a part of critical infrastructure. Considering the current legal landscape, the "photographing prohi- bited" signage has no legal power. The aforesaid legal regulation included in the Act on Homeland Defense has not been fully implemented, with no pattern of the signa- ge defined. Furthermore, currently, the security guards working at facilities such as power stations or defense industry com- panies are not granted any extended, or extraordinary ri- ghts, especially applicable beyond the limits of the given facility. Should this still be the case? Let's discuss that in the next part of the article. ANALYSIS