Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1536266
Problems of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in a Full‑Scale War On April 2, 2022, the Ukrainian MOD officially announced that the entire territory of Kyiv Oblast had been recaptured by the Ukrainian army from the Russian army. Thus, the pro- bably most important battle of the war—the Battle of Kyiv—ended in success for the Ukrainian side T he Russian army first attempted, by means of a rapid airborne maneuver, to seize the capital of Ukraine before the defenders could fortify themselves and bring reinforcements into the city; when that failed, it attempted to en- circle the city and cut it off from the rest of the country. In both instances, the Russian approach proved ineffecti- ve. The Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) were able, first, to neutralize Russian efforts to airlift large quantities of tro- ops, and then to halt the forces used to encircle the city by attacking their logi- stics and harassing them from all sides. The Ukrainian army that won this crucial 2022 battle had been structured based on concepts derived from the active fi- ghting in Donbas in 2014–2015. The period following the ceasefire (which, in fact, was never fully observed in Donbas) was used by the Ukrainians to thoroughly reorganize their armed forces—you can read more about this in another of our articles in a previous issue of FO!. Reforms implemented by Chief of the General Staff Gen. Muzhen- ko and Defense Minister Gen. Poltorak expanded and standardized the armed forces' structure, improved logistics and training systems, all with signifi- cant support from NATO partner coun- tries. Finally, the "old" Ukrainian briga- des created between 2014 and 2021 could, by the end of that period, be considered well‑coordinated and bat- tle‑hardened from the Donbas war. On the other hand, following discussions among Ukrainian expert circles before the 2022 invasion, one could already hear talk of many of the problems that resonate so loudly today—problems with which the AFU was already wre- stling back then. And those are the main subject of today's text. CYCLICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE AFU Russian aggression against Ukraine did not come as a single, concentrated, swift blow. Instead, the Russians spre- ad it out over time, gradually increasing pressure from the early twenty‑first century onward, beginning with po- litical and economic measures. When that did not achieve the desired effect, there followed a period of limited force and hybrid occupation of several re- gions after 2014. Only when that inva- sion also failed to fully succeed did the Russians launch a full‑scale war. This Russian approach gave Ukraine time and opportunity to adapt incrementally to the pressure. Under the rule "what does not kill us makes us stronger," the Ukrainian armed forces developed in a somewhat cyclical fashion. Each cycle brought similar challenges and pro- blems, differing only in scale according to the level of warfare at each stage. In 2014, at the outset, the defense of the state relied heavily on volunteer efforts, which led to a rather chaotic proliferation of various independent volunteer units, formally subordinated to different Ukrainian security mini- www.fragoutmag.com