Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1536266
fire example, the system could be activated if the fire were of cata‑ strophic scale and threatened not single estates but whole towns. However, although the Act speaks generally of threats, the population‑ ‑protection and civil‑defense sys‑ tem is being re‑established due to growing military and hybrid threats, which must be taken into account first and foremost. Threats Hybrid threats are primarily a pro‑ blem for the crisis‑management and anti‑terrorism systems, but they can occur in extremely large forms. Regarding sabotage against critical infrastructure, it might be the "accidental" severing of a sin‑ gle undersea cable, but it could also be far more serious incidents. One can easily imagine a massive stri‑ ke on the power infrastructure by severing high‑voltage lines feeding a large urban agglomeration. This could paralyze many city functions: trams would stop, cars couldn't be refuelled, card payments or ATM withdrawals would be impossible. Hospitals would face a dramatic si‑ tuation – generators' fuel lasts only a few hours, so a mass evacuation of the sick would be needed – and new patients would continue to arrive needing care. Railway lines would be clogged – after all, most are electri‑ fied. Sounds familiar? We experien‑ ced this at the end of April 2024 in Europe… Similarly dramatic could be the con‑ sequences of a massive attack on the fuel‑supply system or on transport as such, where the direct effects (e.g. lack of fuel) are compounded by indirect ones – with fuel supply cut, even the uniformed services could run out. When it comes to conven‑ tional attacks, the first possibility is a small‑scale strike. It might be a volley of missiles or guided bombs aimed at a symbolic target (say, Wawel), a military one (for instance a radar post), or an economic one (for example a refinery). A single attack would probably have just one goal – to produce a psychological and political effect. Naturally, one or several facilities would be destroyed or damaged, and rescue operations directed there, but the main aim wo‑ uld be something else. It would be an attack on Polish territory, sho‑ wing the adversary felt untroubled by possible consequences; if par‑ tially successful and some missiles reached their mark, it would create the impression that our air‑defense system had failed. It would also be a test of the public warning sys‑ tem – and failing it would have de‑ structive results in the form of loss of public trust. Panic might ensue, manifested, for example, by chaotic attempts to flee perceived danger zones or by hoarding all available fo‑ odstuffs (how many are still eating pasta bought at the start of the pandemic for that reason?). Thus, the population‑protection system would need first to control public emotions, in order to prevent crisis deepening. A good sample of those emotions was seen during the Prze‑ wodów incident or the Bydgoszcz missile crisis, where chance events triggered enormous public anxiety. For missile and air strikes, the se‑ cond scenario is a full‑scale air campaign, possibly complemented by sabotage. Repeated attacks on selected state‑function sectors – such as industry, infrastructure, or the armed forces – could potentially break the society's will to resist and weaken the state's capacity. Exam‑ ples include Operation Allied Force, the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia, or Russia's repeated attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure. In such cases, the challenges for the ci‑ vil‑defense system will be enormous. ANALYSIS