Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1536266
"boomers"), exemplified by the U.S. Ohio-class submarines and the Soviet Typhoon (Project 941 "Akula"), Air-delivered nuclear ordnance in the form of bombs and air-launched cruise missiles carried by strategic bombers—e.g., the U.S. B-52 Stratofortress and the Soviet Tu-95 "Bear." Developing three distinct basing methods for strategic nuclear weapons stemmed from the fear that if only one ICBM deployment mode existed, an adversary could more easily neutralize it—and that technical failures could have catastrophic consequences when launching a retaliatory strike. It is noteworthy that on both sides of the Iron Curtain, ready alert duties were maintained 365 days a year not only by land-based ICBM crews, but also by strategic bomber crews: often airborne continuously; and nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines on extended deterrent patrols. Command-and-control elements, including airborne command posts (e.g., the U.S. Operation Looking Glass), also stood ready permanently, on both sides. American experts' fears of losing their edge in strategic nuclear forces were well founded. By pouring vast sums into weapons programs and scientific research, the USSR was gradually closing its technological gap. Planners of the era stressed that the purpose of U.S. strategic forces was to deter a Soviet nuclear strike on the United States and its allies. Should that deterrence fail, U.S. strategic forces had to be able to deliver a decisive counter-strike to break the USSR's military potential and secure America's post-war position. Only the U.S. possessed the nuclear capacity to match Soviet arsenals. Analysis of intelligence data and satellite imagery indicated that, soon, American Titan and Minuteman ICBMs might no longer be capable of mounting an effective retaliatory strike if Soviet forces first destroyed U.S. land-based launchers. New basing methods were assessed against multiple criteria-each with several sub-criteria-such as: 1. Survivability: vulnerability to countermeasures, survivability-tied independence from other triad legs, resistance to counter-strike, 2. Operational availability: unauthorized access, protection against terrorist attack, readiness, 3. Technical risk: project complexity and reliability, ANALYSIS