Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1536266
without causing a detonation. As noted, there were technical difficulties with effectively recovering nuclear warheads over vast ocean areas. The main drawbacks were considered to be: @ lack of precision in striking fortified targets, whose destruction is crucial in the early phases of a nuclear conflict, @ relatively short time the warhead could remain in orbit (maximum of 15 days), limited by the battery life powering the payload, @challenging uplink for targeting data, @ placing nuclear warheads in orbit via the means of ICBMs could be interpreted by the Soviets as a nuclear strike, @ high dependence on early warning systems, @ breach of international Space Treaty of 1967, @ vulnerable to attack against command and early warning systems, @capability loss in false alarm circumstances, @challenging post- deorbitation payload recovery. Pros: @ low costs. The next solution under consideration was the SUM (Shallow Underwater Missile). This project was based on relocating land-based missiles underwater, where the launcher would be a miniature diesel-electric submarine towing externally mounted container-pods housing the MRB (Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles). Each submarine was to carry between two and four such pods, connected via an electrical system. They would operate up to 1,000 nautical miles from the U.S. coast during combat patrols lasting approximately four weeks. In the event of a missile launch, these containers were to be raised into a vertical position and released on a cable toward the ocean surface, where they would be fired. As can be seen, this project presented a number of technical and doctrinal challenges. Its drawbacks were identified as: it offered no improvement to the survivability of the U.S. nuclear triad, it was similar to TRIDENT missiles but far less technologically advanced, it would be introduced very late—alongside new submarines. The advantages of this system included: low environmental impact, positive social impact—the need to develop infrastructure (bases for the submarines). The concept also had a number of different disadvantages, disqualifying the idea technology-wise. Another interesting concept was HYDRA. This idea was based on making it more difficult for the adversary to locate ICBM launchers by launching them from the sea surface. The water-resistant missiles would be deployed onto the surface from civilian ships. The ICBMs would then move across the water in groups, with launches occurring as needed. In a later phase, launches from the decks of civilian ships were also envisioned. This concept also had several cons: @ Risk of missiles being damaged, or even incapacitated by other sailing ships, @Only post-warning deployment feasible, @ Issues associated with false alerts, @ Environment for operations. Low environmental footprint was among one of the advantages. ORCA was another interesting solution. The system was very much similar to HYDRA. It assumed storage of ICBMs in containers at the seabed, where they would be awaiting orders. There were plenty of issues here: www.fragoutmag.com