Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1086092
have a strong anti-air component – our east- ern neighbors are not overoptimistic when it comes to their advantage in the airspace over the battlefield. After all, the history of conflicts taking place with their involvement (including as "advisers") shows that they are capable of operating effectively with no or minimum air support, taking advantage of their strong air defenses and REW measures, which helps them protect their units. One of the measures used to this end is the brigade-level air defense, which – naturally – overlaps with higher-rank air defense systems. It is so effective that it virtually does not involve (given the risk of unacceptable losses) the direct use of attack helicopters or jets in the area of the defended groups. It is important to add that MLRS supporting helicopters is not a solution of such type, which was proven by two domestic series of the "Victor Strike" exercises taking place over a decade ago. The present concept of the use of helicopters such as the AH-64E assumes staying about 8 km away from the battlefield, a support of MLRSs and drones to break the enemy's defenses or strike targets from outside the range of the group's air defense. But it is a quite risky assumption, which may turn out deceptive if extensive and deep-echeloned air defenses are engaged in practice, and this is exactly the case of Russia. The measure of success of air defenses is not the number of the destroyed means of airborne attack, but the effectiveness in protecting the de- fended units. In general, we can see a trend of "pushing" aviation "out" of the area of operations of brigade air defenses and an attempt to level it out by using standoff weapons, drones, and artillery-rocket measures. Although we do make some desperate attempts to develop a system composed of PAF, Wisła (IBCS), Homar, Regina, and Kruk, given the limited amount of resources, it will be a mere "miniature" of the American potential. So we might be on the wrong track here. Enhancing the capability of the rocket and tube artillery is surely a good and cost-effective solution. In the case of the rocket artillery, it should be provided with big quantities of DPICM munitions – this ammunition is still irreplaceable in some types of operations. As for the tube artillery, it should be provided with DPICM as well, but a more important thing is to purchase "smart" "auto-targeting" ammunition – at present, there are at least three types of such solutions avail- able in the market (BONUS, SMARt, SADARM), and to be fair, they are the most effective artillery measures to fight tanks. For instance – the in-combat engagement of the SADARM during OIF in 2003 was considered a great success. According to official information, 121 projectiles destroyed 48 vehicles, which gives a record-setting 2.5 projectile per destroyed vehicle. The records with post-engagement conclusions suggested that it took a maximum of three projectiles (a total of six submunitions) to destroy a tank, although it was possible to make it happen using two in Iraq. The average rate of effectiveness for the three abovementioned solutions implies that you need two projectiles (and four submunitions) to destroy one vehicle. It is a very good result, and the absence of a GPS potentially vulnerable to jam- ming or the lack of the necessity to illuminate the target (which may LAND FORCES