Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1086092
be impossible and reveal the act of attack) are certainly big advan- tages. Weapons of such type are quite expensive, but really effective measures in combating vehicles. No wonder that many technically advanced (and rich) armies of the world have already acquired such ammunition – or intend to do so. The obvious disadvantage of the said solutions is their cost – and comparing the prices of contracts concluded in different countries, in different periods of time, and sometimes including "concealed" subsidies of domestic manu- facturers is pointless, of course. But it is possible to speak of certain estimate proportions of prices of projectiles. DPICM rockets and projectiles are about 3 times more expensive than the regular HEs, and the projectiles with "self-guided" submunitions are about 20 times costlier than DPICM. That said, the prices of single precision munition units come as a shock – in 2014, a 155 mm Excalibur projectile cost around USD 60–70,000, and one GMLRS rocket – about GBP 38,000. The prices were similar in the past decade – a 120 mm XM-395 grenade cost USD 10,000, the first ver- sion of the French-Swedish BONUS was to be valued up to USD 35,000 in 2003, and the German SMARt was worth USD 50–60,000. The American SADARM did not 'fall be- hind', as it was priced at USD 50–60,000 as well. On 155 mm high-explosive incendiary projectile purchased by MND from ZM Dezamet cost a bit less than PLN 21,000 – according to data from 2014. But these solutions are re- ally worth their price given their outstanding effectiveness and the hardly effective countermeasures available to the enemy. The issue of ATGMs is quite complex – they will be less and less effective in the years to come – despite the im- plementation of certain solutions to 'overcome' APSs; yet, they will still remain a solution irreplaceable in combating most tanks. It's obvious that our domestic military industry doesn't have the know-how to design modern ATGMs ca- pable of defeating active protection systems from scratch and to manufacture them. It is therefore necessary to turn to foreign solutions. Considering our domestic conditions, the question of whether it's better to purchase more Spikes or implement some other new solution is of lesser impor- tance – what should matter is the possibly quickest transfer of technology and right to integrate rockets freely with new solutions. Sure enough, the need to integrate the KTO Rosomak with an ATGM system and to have a new IFV factory-equipped with ar- mor-piercing rockets is urgent. We also need to triple the number of launchers at our disposal. Again – this will cost a fortune, but we should bear in mind that in terms of money, the amounts spent on the entire Kruk program, of question- able value with regard to its anti-tank capability, would be enough to provide our Land Forces with ATGMs matching those used by the US Army and to purchase modern auto-targeting artillery munitions... The engineering measures in use should be substantially enhanced too – these are relatively cheap but very effective means to fight ar- mored-mechanized units. We're talking about scatterable and laid mines, off-route mines, smart minefields, minelayers, etc. The last thing on the list is the lowest level of anti-tank defense – down from a company. The issue meshes smoothly with the question of what the Polish military industry can offer in terms of anti-tank defense. What can we manufacture ourselves? To start with, it's necessary to stress that if we look at the lifecy- cle of any advanced military equipment, the price of its purchase is only 30-40% of its cost, 60-70% is its maintenance, repairs, etc. In the case of some programs (e.g. the M1 Abrams), after over 30 years the proportion amounts to 10 to 90%(!). That's why smart countries make every effort to be given the right to take advantage of the possibly most extensive range of maintenance coverage, of renovation services, and of the possibilities regarding modernization and integration with new weapons because this is where the major part of ac- quisition of equipment and weaponry lies. Countries with a post-colonial mentality are all about manufacturing un- der license, paying no heed to such "trifles" as the prices of spare parts, maintenance services, right to maintain or to integrate and develop the purchased solution. What's more – transferring the "manufacturing process" to the buying s country is usually very profitable for the selling country because it makes offsetting possible, and the least profitable part of the process (final assembly, weld- ing) is carried out at a lower cost in the buying country, and the most important subassemblies are still supplied from the manufacturer's foreign plants. And an absolute master stroke is to locate "offsetting" and "manufacturing" in for- eign plants under complete control of the seller's company in the buyer's country... It's important to remember, though, that sometimes it's pointless to "reinvent the wheel" and buying a reasonably negotiated license can appear to be much more cost-ef- fective. The key is to secure the said 60–70% of costs and the country's vital interest in the time of war and economy mobilization program. We're totally self-sufficient at the lowest possible lev- el – ZM Dezamet plants produce both rifle grenades and high-explosive dual-purpose grenades for automatic and underbarrel grenade launchers. The first of them is the GNPO 40 mm grenade, able to pierce 80 mm RHA. The second is the NGKO high-explosive dual-pur- pose round able to pierce through a 50-mm RHA, manufactured under Nammo's license. There are also works aimed at designing a 40 mm HEDP-40. Although some may find such type of AP rounds fun- ny, the truth is that it is still very useful in combating light-armored vehicles, and that's why many armies keep on using such solutions and working on new ones of such type. Actual- ly, a platoon's saturation attack involving the use of rifle grenades and e.g. a revolver-type grenade launcher with HEDP-40 may be just as effective against e.g. a BTR-82A as the (now withdrawn) RPG-76 Komars. As usual, Poland's problem is the matter of a regular anti-tank solution for the platoon-company level. There are two choices to be made here. The first involves the said purchase of expensive and highly-specialized armor-piercing weapons able to fight reactive and www.fragoutmag.com