Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1220268
of employment, education, military or NGO activities. Weapons that are easy to hide and use – firearms, portable an- ti-tank weapons and various explosives – would constitute the core of the ar- senal in use. As many conflicts exemplify it, specialized elements securing the ki- netic operations within the scope of lo- gistics, medical support or special skills (snipers) would also be quite useful. The weapons and supplies could potentially be hidden before the conflict begins, in properly prepared caches. For reasons pertaining to geography, adopting a set of covert operational rules in urban environments seems to be the way to go. Plains, forests that are easily accessible and moderate cli- mate, all create circumstances in which military units could only stay for short periods behind the enemy lines, with that presence also being limited to re- connaissance units, special forces or elements that have found themselves in isolation as a result of the operational scenarios unfolding in unexpected di- rection. Attempts could potentially be made to hide among the civilians which would also provide a survivability boost and increase the chances to conduct op- erations effectively. Furthermore, cities are perceived as natural nodes along the supply routes. Transfers of the military units and supplies will be made with the use of the urban infrastructure. People forming the conspiracy struc- tures would need to be equipped with proper documents and fake bios. They would also need to master a broad range of skills related to being a part of resistance. And here is where the first problem may emerge. The potential adversary – Russia in our case – would not really face any chal- lenge in mastering the culture or the language. Contrary, it would be easy to identify the persons who could be forming the resistance even before the conflict begins. This can be done both through analysis of publicly available sources, such as social media, as well as through covert intelligence agent op- erations. As Poland is a highly developed country, numerous databases contain- ing data of the citizens exist, starting from the PESEL ID database, through numerous HR, medical, banking or in- surance databases. Owning at least a couple of those may make it easier to identify the specific persons. Other technological advancements are making the problem even more convo- luted. During the German occupation the Nazi Germans were issuing their own ID cards also recording the finger- prints. Existence of a database as such back then was limited as going through its resources required a lot of manpow- er. However, in contemporary setting the occupying nation would be able to rapidly create a database of biometrics (fingerprints, retina scans, face photo- graphs), also equipping the soldiers with portable scanners connected to that database. This is not an extraordinary technological feat, biometric IDs has become quite common these days. And the hypothetical occupant would not need to comply with any limitations or regulations pertaining to personal data processing. This would relevantly lim- it the operational freedom of irregular forces also leading to significant losses of personnel. Furthermore, use of force would not be a subject to any limitations. No 'mini- mum collateral damage' principle would be valid, not to mention the property or natural resources. Forests providing shelter for the guerrilla fighters would be subjected to massive airstrikes and artillery shelling, before the infantry enters the area. Urbanized areas would suffer from similar scenarios – with repression or search operations taking the shape mentioned above. Obviously, it is possible to adopt reme- dial countermeasures, especially due to the fact that the capabilities of the po- tential adversary, even though they are impressive, are not unlimited. The en- emy forces would not be omnipresent, they will also remain unable to control everybody within the given territory. What follows, the scope of undertaken actions would need to take the risks tak- en into the equation as well. It would not be rational to stalk the occupying nation in a continuous manner though. Attack- ing ordinary troops, mechanized units or other elements can be considered to be ANALYSIS