Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1220268
aware of the language, customs, stanc- es and fears of the local communities, but they could also use all of the above knowledge to their advantage. The state forces, be it intervention, occupation or stabilization forces, are often placed in a foreign land, and acquisition of the cultural capital is quite often a lengthy and painful process. Directly naming it: when a translator is required just to read a writing on the wall, not to men- tion activities that are far more com- plex, with interpreter/translator loyalty also being questionable, it is difficult to speak of effective fight for support from the locals. Another relevant factor here is the abil- ity to receive external support, as the history has shown in the past. The pop- ulation and endorsement on its part is not enough though. To fight one needs weapons and training. It is even more beneficial to have a place at one's dis- posal where one can send fighters to rest, train or recover from potential injuries. Comfort as such was provided to Yugoslavian or French resistance who enjoyed more support from the west than the Home Army that was fighting is far less friendly conditions. On the other hand, the society is also an important domain, with its ability to accept the growing cost of control or occupation of the given area. The above refers to both soldiers (losses includ- ed), defense expenditure and the polit- ical cost entailed by a lack of an easy win or the necessity to wait for politics to resolve. This mechanism could have been witnessed in case of France, during the war in Algeria, or in the US, during the Vietnam conflict. The role of the me- dia was especially important in CONUS – the reporters created an image of war that was far from optimistic which fueled the anti-war protests and move- ments. The anti-war/pro-peace move- ments were becoming stronger when middle-class family sons were drafted, students included. The Americans have learned their lesson there. The problem related to necessary public endorse- ment has been mitigated by departure from compulsory military service in the US. This, along with lower losses in per- sonnel and the specific relationship that the US society has established with the military, altogether lead to a situation in which the current conflicts, even though they last much longer than the Vietnam War, do not create any social opposition. Russia did a similar thing during the second war in Chechnya, despite the different institutional con- text. As Russia decided to replace the conscripts with professionalized force or contractors, also introducing media censorship and blocking the opposition, the protests against the war were di- minished to the bare minimum. What is more, a non-democratic state is usually less reserved when using means drastic in nature, mass repressions included. A question emerges: would operations as such be meaningful for Poland, con- sidering the current context of the situ- ation? Potentially, undertaking irregular warfare against a foreign aggressor occupying some, or the whole territo- ry could be attractive. It is also quite easy to define the shape the irregular forces shall take. The attractive nature of a scenario as such is amplified by the fact that Poland has a potential at its disposal that is much less significant, quantity- and quality-wise, than the Russian one. Should a conflict break out and the alliance commitments fail in pro- viding support, one should expect a dire sequence of events. Notably, NATO countries did get ready for potential occupation during the Cold War. The preparatory steps included training of special operations forces, as well as formation of stay behind net- works – the largest media appearance of such could have been witnessed in case of the Italian "Gladio", once it was exposed. It is easy to demonstrate how a net- work of contacts as such would look in the Polish context. The basic component would come in a form of small, auton- omous elements consisting out of up to 12 man. Optimally, these elements would be formed by 4 to 6 man embed- ded within the existing community net- works that would provide support in the given area. It is also possible that these elements themselves would be formed by persons that trust each other, who knew themselves before, had shared ex- perience during the same period, place www.fragoutmag.com