Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1220268
The above does not mean though that irregular warfare is all about tactics and technology. Other factors come into play as well. To make it possible for the irregular forces to work, they need peo- ple with guns in their hands and those who can support the operations in sev- eral other ways as well. Deficiencies in infrastructure and equip- ment need to be replaced by work. Whether that refers to persons who would store weap ons and materials in hides, or people gath- ering intelligence, maintaining communica- tions or disseminating propaganda - sup- port provided by the population will always be necessary. This pattern is well known for anybody who has some knowledge on the Home Army operations in Poland, during the WW2. And similarly, as in case of occupied Poland, underground non-mili- tary structures could also be established, dealing with education, administration or the law, not to mention a government or its counterparts. The stakes in the game would be high, to establish and maintain organization as such. Guerrilla warfare can be divided into three possible phases. The first one is a silent uprising, with single acts of violence, often created by the emerg- ing circumstances. Guerrilla warfare is phase II, during which the intensity of operations go up. Third phase is an open confrontation that takes on a form equivalent to regular warfare. And yet again, also in case of the Polish resis- tance, we could have witnessed the phases mentioned above – from or- ganization of the structures, through starting ongoing combat ops (by Związek Odwetu [Union of Retaliation], Wachlarz [Hand Fan] and Kedyw [par- tial acronym of Kierownictwo Dywersji "Directorate of Diversion"], to plans of mass uprising that came into being in a form of the operation "Burza" [Storm] and the Warsaw Uprising. Analyzing the irregular warfare in Poland, within the context of the war is fairly easy, as the population did support operations as such. The Third Reich wanted either to exterminate the population (especial- ly the Jews), or use it as cheap, slave labor. Hence, collaborationism, with the occupying nation was limited to persons and groups gaining benefits from that or cynically wanting to support the win- ners. The situation was somewhat different in case of other conflicts during which the society was divided by ethnicity, religion or language, with those divisions often playing a decisive role. In situation as such both sides tend to compete to gain support of the locals, trying to win their hearts and minds. Here, a myriad of activities and propaganda techniques can be employed to convince people to support the giv- en cause. Usually the weaker side – the guerrillas – wins conflict as such, with a greater cultural potential available at hand. As the locals, not only are they ANALYSIS