Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1220268
analysis becomes even more convolut- ed when the irregular, guerrilla warfare becomes the only form of fighting in the given conflict, while in different circum- stances operations as such sometimes just accompany other activities. These can be a component of warfare also in- volving the regular forces (as in case of WWII), or they may also be an element of a power play between the superpow- ers (this may be exemplified by virtually all of the Cold War proxy wars). As we can see, no simple explanation exists as to why such tactics are effective in some circumstances. One of the clarifications here pertains to the guerrilla warfare tactics alone. Conventional forces can detect and fight only their counterpart. During reg- ular warfare units and elements of both sides operate in high quantities, they utilize expansive supply chains, comms network and other infrastructure. It re- mains quite difficult to require it from an armored division to be able to detect scattered groups of guerrillas (squads or platoons), without uniforms, numer- ous communication assets or expan- sive supply chain. Military operations can become even more convoluted in urban, mountainous or forested areas. On the other hand however, the support assets of regular forces, including the supply chain, can be potentially exposed to surprise attacks. When the concept of frontline becomes fuzzy the "behind enemy lines" domain also ceases to ex- ist. The above means that the weaker side may attack the enemy by surprise where it is possible to establish local, momentary advantage. In those circum- stances these forces would be driven to create maximum effect with the least amount of effort. The above also translates into hitting the places where the hit would be the most painful – not the ones where the enemy is ready to take the hits. Thus, it is critical to identify and hit the center of gravity, namely the asset or resources thanks to which the seemingly stronger side can conduct its operations. Let us stay with the movie examples. The principle mentioned above can be well illustrated by the "Black Hawk Down" movie and the actual events of October 3rd 1993. The Americans were considering the helicopter mobility to be the center of gravity, along with the troops themselves, as the value of lives was extremely different for both sides. Shooting down of the first helicopter forced Task Force Ranger to change the plan that, ultimately, led to a loss of mo- bility and victims - unacceptable for the US society. For reasons quite similar, IEDs were one of the most serious threats in Af- ghanistan and Iraq, having a potential to inflict serious personnel losses among the coalition forces. Well-trained and well-armed western troops had a signif- icant advantage in firefights, thus, this was not the way to have an impact on them. As we know, this created a re- sponse with proper remedial measures being introduced: HMMVW and similar vehicles were being replaced by Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. When MRAP vehicles were becoming more and more common, the methods of attack were also modified according- ly. Methods and tactics race were quite similar during the Vietnam War and in other conflicts as well. Here delivery of the FIM-92 Stinger MANPADS to the Afghans during the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan may be a good example, with that delivery aimed at limiting the operating freedom for the Mi-24 heli- copters. www.fragoutmag.com