Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1519846
of those „contract" troops came into the army from the group of mobilized men who, following the fighting in 2014 and 2015, were deciding to remain in active service. Some of them went back to their civil professions, signing the contracts later, as the conditions of service improved and salary levels increased. In that way, Kyiv managed to create the core of the new, Ukra- inian Armed Forces, in which the sol- diers were staying with their units longer, also frequently knowing their commanders since the intense battles of 2014. Not only did that speed up the professionalization of the Ukrainian brigades, but it was also a major mo- rale boost. It is said that until 2022, at least 400,000 Ukrainian men served in the military and had real-life combat experience, and even more served and went through basic training. Conside- ring the above, that period was a true „factory of reserves" for the Ukrainian military. These efforts majorly contri- buted to the Ukrainian ability to face the Russian aggression on February 24th, 2022. The soldiers who left the military due to demobilization, or due to the expiration of their contract, were all gathered by the Ukrainian command to create a „Reserve Corps", including several complete armored, mechanized, and artillery brigades. These brigades, starting from 2017, engaged in exerci- ses involving their personnel, while the equipment for them was being stored at bases, with its readiness being ma- intained. In the Spring and Summer of 2022, these brigades became the first, actual reserve units that supported the frontline units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, showing signs of battle fatigue. The Territorial Defense units and struc- ture, between 2015 and 2021, only existed on paper. In reality, the Army drained most of the valuable Human Re- sources here. No exercises were being held, no real funds were available to support this system, and no weapons remained at hand. The authorities were engaged in a discussion on the direc- tion of reforms for this structure, also debating whether it is needed in circumstances in which Russia tran- sitioned from a destabilizing operation to a regular war. The situation started to change under the Russian pressure in 2019. The continuous increase in the number of Russian troops assembling at the Ukrainian border, and the obvio- us understaffing of the Ukrainian Ar- med Forces, insufficient to defend the long border, forced the government to initiate a reform of the Territorial De- fense system. The Territorial Defense Brigades started to be formed as late as 2021, and the process concluded with the Russian invasion already unde- rway, in 2022. The Ukrainian command also started to rearrange and expand the structures of the UAF. The Ukrainian brigades rota- tionally maintained their frontline pre- sence. This made it possible to trans- form the units staying in the back so that they could be sent to the frontline in a new form. As I already mentioned, the key task at hand that the Ukrainian command was facing was to bring the mosaic of the individual elements and regular units (some of which were in a state of decay, following the fighting in 2014 and 2015), as well as the in- dependent, self-standing volunteer ele- ments, into a proper order, and integra- te them all into a single organism. The elements that were reluctant to follow the process were withdrawn from the frontline, and forced to get mobilized (even by force!), as it happened in the case of the nationalist Ukrainian Volun- teer Corps, existing as an autonomous element for the longest, among other similar units. The Corps's structure was retained even after it left the fron- tline area. These units were partially frozen and then reconstructed in 2022. The said volunteer unit was used as a base for the regular, 67th Mechanized Brigade. This happened during the cu- rrent integration phase regarding the Ukrainian Army, still going on today, but most of the volunteer units simply blen- ded with the regular brigades. This is shown in the structural shape of tho- se units. Each of the legacy Ukrainian brigades, from now on, featured one, or sometimes even two extra motori- zed battalions. Many of those elements retained their symbolics, and the bat- talion name often made a reference to the predecessor volunteer unit, based on which the battalion was formed. Sometimes a couple of such battalions were fused, and used to create new, light (motorized) brigades. This move made it possible to fuse the advantages of the volunteer units, with their high morale, or patriotic spirit, with greater discipline, better coordination, and the logistics of the regular units. The vo- lunteer officers, often simply appoin- ted as commanders as their soldiers, became a part of the army structure, went through officer training, and were ultimately promoted to battalion and brigade commanders of the UAF. That process of fusing these units also en- hanced the Army reputation as a whole, among the members of Ukrainian socie- ty. The romantic image of volunteer heroes who saved the country in 2014 was transferred to the Armed Forces as a whole. The UAF became the sole state institution whose authority and popularity reached a stable level of ca. 80%. This metric was special, in the Ukrainian context. The Ukrainian command also launched a process of a massive expansion of the structures of the military. The war in 2014 and 2015 has shown the real va- lue of main battle tanks and artillery as- sets on the battlefield, especially with the limited employment of air assets caused by the fact that the frontline ANALYSIS