Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1519846
Transitional Period Army. PART II The article is the second part of coverage done by Mikołaj Susujew, attempting to answer the question as follows: How did the Ukrainians manage to reform their Armed Forces post-2014, in anticipation of the full-scale Russian aggression? Battle Reforms. TSo expansive description of the situ- ation preceding the proper reforms in the Armed Forces of Ukraine is neces- sary to comprehend the challenges fa- ced by the Ukrainian military and under- stand the starting point at which the Armed Forces found themselves, befo- re the reforms. No time, or options to implement a large-scale reform during the 2014-2015 battle were available. This has become possible only after the frontline stabilized and with the intensi- ty of engagements going down. In late summer of 2014, Ukraine already had a new president - Petro Poroshenko. The new authorities realized that only strong Armed Forces could guarantee the stability of the existence of the sta- te. Hence, the matters in the military domain started to be rearranged as early as 2015. The defense expenditu- re was also increased, constituting up to 5% of GDP, which was a multiplied increase, compared to Yanukovych's term of office. However, considering a major increase in the number of troops (to 250,000 troops in service), and the major needs and requirements the „new" army had, the money was still in the „insufficient" category. The funds were enough, however, to maintain and overhaul the heavy equipment, and to restore artillery pieces and main battle tanks from deep storage. However, the money was entirely insufficient to con- duct a broad modernization program or to replace the legacy inventory with brand-new equipment. A separate Army tax was introduced by the government as well. The increased defense budget translated into increased salaries in the military - dependent on the specific unit, and positions. Extra money was also allocated for the soldiers fighting directly on the frontline. For instance, back in 2014, a private was getting a salary of UAH 2,000 (ca. USD 130), and on the frontline, the salaries were as high as UAH 5,000 (ca. USD 330). In 2018 the corresponding amounts were UAH 11,000 (USD 423), and UAH 23,000 (USD 900). By NATO standards this pay is modest, but in the Ukrainian context, this was a major improvement leading to enhancement of the social status of the military profession. When the fighting became less intense, sala- ries became one of the key factors at- tracting men to serve between 2015 and 2022. Slow, gradual professionalization of the Armed Forces has become another re- levant change. The general, conscripted service still existed, but solely as a tool needed to create army reserves. The conscripts were being trained, but without being sent to the frontline. They were kept away from the real fi- ghting. Some of the conscripts, after doing their general, compulsory servi- ce, were deciding to sign contracts for a few years, continuing to serve. Most Article text: Mikołaj Susujew Images Credit:Marcin Ogdowski www.fragoutmag.com