Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1536266
mising, but it soon became clear that the old, unreformed TCC system would not accept these changes and began to sabotage them. TCC representatives declared that they would not recogni- ze the new digital system and insisted on in‑person visits, refusing to accept digital records. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense entered into open conflict with the mobilization system, which, in Ukraine, is subordinated not to the ministry but directly to the armed for- ces. The same hostility was directed at the new recruitment system, which the TCCs viewed as a competitor and sought to undermine. Initial enthusiasm waned, and today we have a dual sys- tem. On one side, the "Digital Reserve Registry+" is officially in force and required by many government agencies when conducting official business, while on the other the TCCs remain deeply skeptical and continue to carry out mobilization in the old pre‑reform style. Busification has slowed somewhat, but citizens' fears and hostility toward the TCCs remain, preventing any real im- provement in the mobilization process and constituting one of the main causes of manpower shortages at the front. Correcting the current flaws in this system is an extremely difficult task. The TCC system has exhausted itself and requires a thorough overhaul— even a complete restructuring on new principles. That is almost impossible in a war of this intensity, when reinforce- ments are needed now, not a year later after a successful reform. Moreover, these problems are compounded by other factors: inadequate training of newly conscripted soldiers, poor quality of command in newly formed brigades, shortages of combat and fire‑support assets at the front, a scarcity of ar- mored equipment, and many others. There is no simple solution to Ukraine's problems in this domain. The approach must be comprehensive, radically chan- ging the system so it attracts rather than repels recruits. In my view, Ukra- ine still has no shortage of potential soldiers—it lacks an adequate, modern mobilization system that would motiva- te people to serve instead of deterring them. 3. TRAINING The problem of training Ukrainian units grew alongside the mobilization crisis, as the pool of combat‑experienced volunteers was exhausted and losses mounted among front‑line units. The massive expansion of the army, with the formation of many new units whose officer cadres, enlisted ranks, and staf- fs all had to be trained from scratch, exacerbated this problem. Ukraine simply lacks sufficient instructors and training grounds for the vast num- bers of soldiers being inducted. There is also a shortage of time and suitable facilities for training officers and non- ‑commissioned officers. And there are no safe locations within the country's borders where newly formed units can rehearse maneuvers and tactics with large numbers of personnel and equip- ment, because the entire territory is within range of Russian missile stri- kes. NATO support has been immensely helpful: the alliance formed a coalition of countries that have now trained over 100,000 Ukrainian soldiers. Yet even that training has its shortcomings and limitations. NATO countries seldom tra- in whole Ukrainian brigades; more often they train single elements. The courses are typically very short by the stan- dards of professional Western armies, which affects their quality. Differences in doctrine and approach across allian- ce members—despite standardized procedures—create difficulties when integrating Ukrainian units at the front. Troops trained in different countries must undergo a period of alignment and standardization on Ukrainian soil. Lan- guage barriers further degrade training quality. Training an officer—especially a battalion‑ or brigade‑level staff officer (let alone a corps or division comman- der)—in a NATO country is a long and costly process, usually preceded by an English course. Ukraine cannot afford to send its officers on such lengthy programs, usually having to be prece- ded by an English language course. Meanwhile, as the reservoir of com- bat‑seasoned officers is depleted, ne- wly formed units increasingly include officers in name only—those who have completed only a brief university‑affilia- ted course with no real command expe- rience. Such officers typically lack both authority and practical know‑how, and the short additional courses offered before deployment do little to remedy the situation. Attempts to solve this problem have been ad hoc. Many front‑line units create their own training teams at the ANALYSIS