Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1536266
rear, trying to fill gaps in a recruit's skills before sending him forward. The quality of this supplementary training varies by unit and depends heavily on the competency of the subunit commander. Numerous private organizations—such as pro‑defense foun- dations—also run enhancement courses for soldiers and officers. For instance, the largest Ukrainian pro‑defense foundation "Return Alive" not only supplies equipment to specific units but also provides training in its use and tactics, and even runs its own officers' and NCOs' advanced course. None of these measures, however, can solve the underlying problem. Ukraine will need to build a new training system for of- ficers and soldiers at all levels—one that incorporates lessons from full‑scale war- fare and matches the current scale of its armed forces. That will be extraordinarily difficult to implement during an intense war and likely won't be viable until after the conflict ends. 4. CHAOS IN THE COMMAND STRUC- TURE For some time, the Ukrainian army has struggled with an inefficient battlefield- ‑management system. Despite severalfold army growth—forming dozens of batta- lions, regiments, and brigades—the com- mand system remains largely unchanged since Yanukovych's era, when the force numbered under 150,000. Ad hoc opera- tional commands created to direct units on various front sectors have proved ineffec- tive. Command was often chaotic. These temporary commands, formed for specific tasks, had no permanent complement of subordinate units, bore no direct respon- sibility for those units, lacked knowledge of the actual capabilities of the brigades assigned to them, and had staffs not in- tegrated with lower‑level control organs. Often there were simply too many subordi- nated units for a single staff to coordinate effectively. Consequently, withdrawals do not occur on time, reinforcements fail to arrive in critical moments, and the front collapses. Discussion of this problem has been ongo- ing in Ukraine, with a search for solutions that could be implemented during active combat without completely dismantling the existing army structure. Currently, the ba- sic unit at the front for the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) is the brigade. Due to the lack of an intermediate level of command, brigades are often overwhelmed by a huge number of sub‑units within their ranks. These include not only those that are part of their standard structure but also va- rious additional sub‑units temporarily at- tached to them because the situation on a specific section of the front requires it, and there is no other way to reinforce the brigade. The brigade headquarters is also overloaded, as it must coordinate the ope- rations of such a patchwork of battalions and companies. In 2023, while preparing for its offensive, Ukraine attempted to form several corps. However, in practice, the headquarters of these corps were only responsible for forming and equipping the units. Once they reached the front, they were handed over to commanders of spe- cific frontline sectors. These new brigades never fought on the front as coherent operational formations. By 2024, the need for reform was being openly discussed by the country's leadership. At the end of the year, the AFU command, together with the Ministry of Defense and the government, reached a consensus that the army would adopt a structure based on the system: battalion – brigade – corps – operational commands – army command. This sys- tem was chosen according to the logic of Commander‑in‑Chief Syrskyi, to save re- sources and because, from their point of view, it is the easiest way to reorganize the army. Brigades would simply begin to be grouped into corps, and each corps, as a permanent operational formation, would be assigned its own section of the front to be responsible for. Of course, there is a long road between the announcement of such a reform and its actual implementation. In recent days, numerous leaks from well‑informed so- urces in the Ukrainian information space have emerged regarding the specific cour- se this reform will take. Around 20 corps are planned to be formed, with the core of each being one of the "better" Ukrainian brigades that stand out due to strong www.fragoutmag.com