Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1536266
internal organization, discipline, and hi- gh‑quality command. What's more, the corps themselves are to be built based on these brigades—not top‑down by forming a headquarters and then atta- ching brigades to it, but by creating a new corps headquarters from the staff of one of these core brigades, often even assigning command of the entire corps to that brigade's commander. It is also expected that many officers who have shown talent as good organizers will now be promoted. In my opinion, this approach is interesting but also risky in many ways. It stems from the need to carry out the reform with very limited available reso- urces and a lack of time. Ukraine simply cannot afford to reshape its system in the way Western militaries do, as such a reform would take a decade. As a result, the new corps will often be commanded by individuals who have never coordina- ted actions at this level before, and the integration of units within these new operational formations will have to be learned during actual combat operations rather than on training grounds or thro- ugh war games. At best, officers of the new staffs will be sent to some additional training courses. Leaks suggest that one of the first AFU corps will be formed ba- sed on the 3rd Assault Brigade, comman- ded by former Azov Regiment commander Andriy Biletsky. Another issue is the process of combining brigades and smaller units into corps. At present, armored, infantry, artillery, marine, and airborne brigades, as well as drone regiments and battalions, are scattered across the entire front line. So, if the goal is, for example, to group marine brigades into a real corps that can operate together as an operational formation, it is necessary to concentrate these units in one place—which in prac- tice means pulling them back from the front lines, replenishing them, and then regrouping them as a corps. This could be problematic during a war of such in- tensity, and thus the entire process will likely take a lot of time. It will be a while before it's possible to assess whether the AFU reorganization has succeeded and whether it has improved coordination and command quality at the front. 5. AMMUNITION HUNGER AND EQUIPMENT SHORTAGES Issues related to the supply of various ty- pes of heavy equipment and ammunition from Western countries to Ukraine usu- ally attract considerable attention from experts and commentators in Poland. These are tangible issues, easy to assess and understand. A lack of equipment and ammunition means a bad situation and a weak army. A lot of equipment means a good situation and a strengthened army. However, in Ukrainian discussions about AFU problems, I observe that equipmen- t‑related issues are gradually taking a back seat. Contrary to appearances, the issues described in points 1–4 are consi- dered far more important for the outco- me of clashes on the front line than the equipment question. This is largely due to Western deliveries and, to some extent, the expansion of Ukraine's own produc- tion. For example, Ukraine has managed to launch mass production of its own 155 mm self‑propelled guns, which allows not only for replacing losses but also for sup- plying new guns to newly formed units. Ukraine has also, with the help of compa- nies from Central Europe and using We- stern components, restored significant quantities of so‑called 5th‑category he- avy equipment from its own stockpiles— from BTRs to tanks. More importantly, however, the very nature of the war has changed. The overall number of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles held by Ukraine has only slightly increased compared to the pre‑invasion state in 2022. At best, new brigades have one tank company for support and a small number of 20–40 mm autocannon‑armed vehicles used on the battlefield as a sort of „fire brigade" for destroying Russian infantry assault gro- ups. Most equipment delivered to Ukra- ine consists of light wheeled and tracked vehicles—various types of transporters, MRAPs, and armored vehicles. These are the types of equipment the army curren- tly relies on. However, this is of secon- dary importance, as the nature of the war no longer involves large‑scale use of armored and mechanized forces. No one uses them this way anymore due to the vulnerability of such assaults to mass drone attacks of various kinds. Ukraine still lacks both ammunition and equip- ANALYSIS