Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1536266
ment. Without a doubt, it would also like to have at least one full tank battalion in each brigade and many more valuable infantry fighting vehicles like the Bradley or CV‑90. But acquiring an additional thousand such vehicles would not improve Ukraine's situ- ation as much as effectively reforming its command or mobilization systems would. There are critical areas where the AFU still lacks capability—for instance, basic mortars and other types of crew‑served infantry weapons. This is something that receives little attention in the West but is widely discussed in Ukraine. There is also a shortage of cluster munitions—weapon types that an army of this size requires in large quantities and which would signi- ficantly stiffen Ukrainian defenses against Russian infantry assaults. Still, the impor- tance of this factor compared to the scale of other problems is no longer as great as it was in 2022 or 2023. CONCLUDING NOTES Between 2022 and 2025, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have undergone rapid expansion and transformation. Today, the Ukrainian army bears little resemblance to the force that stopped the Russians outside Kyiv in the spring of 2022. This expansion allowed Ukraine to recapture some occupied territories and, if not com- pletely halt, then at least significantly slow Russian advances on the front. However, the increase in size also revealed many weaknesses in the army and led to the emergence of numerous serious problems that still plague it. These issues significan- tly limit its combat potential, and solving them—as well as another reorganization of the Ukrainian army—is difficult to carry out during high‑intensity combat opera- tions. Still, Ukraine must resolve them, be- cause its survival depends not primarily on its Western partners, but on the efforts of its own armed forces. Western support will be worthless if the AFU, exhausting its resources, collapses under Russian pressure. The only way to prevent this is through internal reforms. A potential ce- asefire may not only offer Russia a chance to rebuild its forces but could also be an opportunity for Ukraine to address the problems described in this article—pro- blems that are extremely difficult to solve under the conditions of heavy frontline fi- ghting and massive personnel losses. Time will tell whether Ukraine rises to the chal- lenge and manages to carry out a major army reform for the second time—com- parable to the one from 2015–2018—or whether its army deteriorates under the pressure of these problems, or even col- lapses altogether, having exhausted its resources and capabilities. www.fragoutmag.com