Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1493095
border. There was not much time to react. One could even say that no time to react was available, as NATO is not actively involved in the war, and the allies do not engage missiles flying in Ukrainian airspace. "And Israel can protect every square inch of its territory", one of the journalists claimed. This is just wishful thinking, that can be debunked with the use of a certain analogy. The air defenses are like the kit that a motorcyclist uses - the suit and the helmet. The motorcyclist cannot protect all of his body from a potential accident. Poland also cannot provide 100% effective air defense systems to all of its regions. The motorcyclist protects his head. The state protects the key organs - the capital city (its brain), large agglomerations, critical infrastructure (factories, refineries, harbors, and so on), or military units. It would be great to implement an ejector seat on a motorbike (or another rescue device) or to have states function in circumstances in which one district is protected by an air defense battery of its own. Theoretically feasible, practically unattainable. One battery of Patriot missiles in each administrative district (Powiat) would guarantee the skies to be threat-tight. We have 308 Powiat administrative units in Poland, while a single Patriot battery costs USD 2.5 bn. Who is going to pay for that? Who would be tasked with manufacturing these systems? How can one align the requirement of rapid deliveries, with the payment distributed across a longer timeline? These challenges cannot be resolved - not only in Poland but also in much richer countries. The United States also would not be able to defend the entirety of its territory. A billionaire motorcycle rider would not be able to procure a system that would guarantee invincibility. What remains to be done is to invest in the best helmets, suits, and knee and arm protectors - whatever may be useful if our body hits the tarmac. Good, single-point air defense systems are the way to go. Assets and Risk-assessment The death of two persons is a tragedy. Leaving the fact that the missile hit the Polish territory close to its border, the incident took place in a municipality where the density of population is among the lowest ones in Poland. Where no elements of critical infrastructure can be spotted, apart from the components of the omnipresent power grid. Even with the best, and the most sophisticated IADS at hand, the missile in question would still hit the ground where it did. There is nothing to defend in the municipality of Przewodów. Let us go back to Israel, and the Iron Dome system is almost a perfect solution. And let us notice some facts. First, Israel is 15 times smaller than Poland. It covers an area equivalent to a single Polish Voivodeship, that can be easily saturated with air defense assets. Secondly, not only is the high lethality of the kinetic components of the system the sole factor contributing to its effectiveness but the efficiency and speed of the ballistic computers shall also be taken into the account here. These compute the trajectory of the incoming threats, and those which are considered to be harmless are usually ignored. That applies to up to 80% of rockets targeting Israel, that hit unpopulated areas, or regions where no critical assets can be found. The remaining 20% are met by the missiles that take down 9 out of 10 threats. The Israeli losses stem from the fact that the IADS is not completely impenetrable, and from the fact that rockets that are ignored tend to kill somebody in the end sometimes. Some people may unluckily find themselves in the area close to the point of impact. Thirdly, the Iron Dome's success has also been achieved due to the threat that the Dome is targeting. We are dealing with simple, unguided rockets, following a ballistic trajectory that can be easily computed. Advanced missiles and projectiles - cruise missiles, or ballistic missiles deploying decoys that are a countermeasure against the air defenses - should be viewed as an entirely different, and far more difficult threat to counter. To achieve 90% of lethality, one would need to attack every airborne object, a couple of times, just to be sure. And here we approach the matter of IADS efficiency that remains limited by the launcher reloading speed on one hand, and economic calculation translating to the shape of the stockpile, and decisive for when we say: "enough is enough". Missile defense system missiles cost dozens of thousands of dollars apiece. The more advanced missiles may cost hundreds of thousands. It is worth covering that cost when defending the most valuable assets. Agricultural areas near the border are not among them. There, the risk of being killed by a missile is as plausible as being hit by a bolt of lightning. This may seem cynical - war is the realm of the accountants. www.fragoutmag.com