Frag Out! Magazine

Frag Out! Magazine #39

Frag Out! Magazine

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rotary-wing assets, and air defenses of its own. The majority of the air assets also underwent upgrades, in recent years. However, as the war in Ukraine has shown, the qualitative shape of that equipment seems to be dubious. Simply speaking, the Russian impermeable A2AD bubble turned out to have as many holes in it, as a sieve. The Ukrainians are regularly executing offensive action. The Russians can shoot down some of the Ukrainian aircraft, but they are unable to achieve air superiority, let alone dominance. Whereas one should note that western intelligence and logistical support are important factors here. If the Ukrainian scenario was to be shifted to Poland, the power balance between Russia and NATO would not look good for the Russians. Poland's potential has been qualitatively enhanced - with 48 F-16s available now. Furthermore, apart from AWACS- and Rivet Joint-driven situational awareness support, kinetic assets would also be deployed. As we have been observing for years, the US is regularly engaged in training that involves the deployment of USAF aviation detachments to Poland, and those train interoperability with the Polish Air Force. Ever since February, Western fighter aircraft have been continuously using Polish airspace. In the event of a war, even a single Polish F-35 squadron would be a game changer - and a single squadron would not be the end of it, in circumstances as such. Furthermore, MRCA would also be accompanied by pure air superiority platforms, and strike assets as well. The involvement of other players in the air campaign, besides the United States, such as the UK, France, or Germany, would only further broaden the gap between NATO, and the potential adversary. The geography is also good for us - given the relatively short distance, and the availability of tankers, it would be easier, if necessary, to conduct operations out of airbases in western Europe. These factors mean that Poland may count on qualitative, and quantitative air support, should a conflict break out. More importantly, air superiority would be achievable, and then air strikes may be happening deep behind the enemy lines. In that context, one should ask what would be desirable, when it comes to the capabilities of the Polish Air Force. Several tasks, including COMAO sorties involving SEAD/DEAD and deep strike activities, would be executed in close collaboration with the allies. No autonomous capabilities would be necessary within that scope, only a partial presence of these assets is going to be sufficient - in a form of a single, specialized squadron that, in the event of a war, would form a large task force with the units deployed from CONUS for instance. It may turn out that other capabilities, including air interdiction. close air support, or defending of own airspace (also during a crisis) would be crucial. In that context, the decision on the procurement of 48 Korean FA-50 jets may be interesting. One may, also ask about alternatives here. Helicopters and UAVs are as important in the air domain, as the MRCA are. Here, the conclusions we draw from ANALYSIS

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