Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1519846
could end up in a tragedy, far exceeding in scale the events in Magdalenka of 2003. Employing military force requires decisions to be made at the governmental and Presidential levels. Counter-terrorist units of the Police alone would not be enough. Even in a perfect world, where the threats are detectable, and reaction is efficient enough for the counterterrorism units to be employed, the area of operations will need to be separated. Here, other forces would be employed, like riot police, or regular police units. These units, along with mobilized elements, and the remainder of the Police force, may also be put into use when a large-scale search operation is needed. This may happen during a pursuit of the terrorist, or it may also have a preventative profile, to detect attempted attack targeting a protected facility, or a railway for instance. Other services have their hands quite tied here (like the Railway Security Guards) - numbers aside, the Railway Security Guard may only operate in railway areas, not in the adjacent areas. Furthermore, the scope of the Police's rights and capabilities may have a key meaning in an area that is not strictly kinetic. Some situations are clear, for instance when a suspicious vehicle is stopped and persons inside engage in a firefight, exposing themselves as the enemy. However, the suspects may behave differently in circumstances like that. Again, the Police's advantage here stems from the fact that the officers, in justified circumstances, can ask for documents, or inspect luggage. Furthermore, the Police is also granted access to several databases - the best-known ones include the population register, and the vehicles and drivers register. It is thus possible to detect persons using false documents early. Also, when the suspects are stopped, it will be necessary to employ typical assets and operational methods, usually associated with the Police. As hybrid warfare is not a conventional wartime scenario, the concept of POW does not apply here. Potential suspects will need to be treated as any other suspect. Both the interrogation, as well as securing of the tracks and evidence may make it possible to accuse such persons and press charges, they may also indicate the true identity of those persons, and those who ordered them to act, and thus associate these persons, and liability for the acts, to other state actor. Obviously, operations as such are also conducted by intelligence services, ABW (Internal Security Agency) in particular. One should note, however, that in a situation in which hybrid operations are taking place, the Police would also be burdened with a lot of procedures tied to the management of the suspects. Especially in circumstances when time is valuable, and resources at the hand of the counterintelligence may turn out to be less than sufficient. Furthermore, the Police itself also has a broad range of possibilities, when it comes to gathering intelligence, especially when the information refers to suspicious situations or persons. Apart from top-level operations - wiretapping and other form of operational activities - the baseline assumption is for the Police to be the „first aid" service, when it comes to public peace and safety. Prevention officers and municipal officers play that role in the Police. Unfortunately, many problems emerge here. Municipal officers assigned to the specific district are often known, but they are nowhere to be seen. Unless you want to obtain a gun permit. Unfortunately, the problem has been persisting for years now. This is relevant, as the district officers should be well-known to the local community and trusted. It is difficult to trust someone whom we do not know and report on the behavior of certain persons, like new neighbors for instance, or on events that are less than typical, departing from the norm, or concerning. One should remember that any system designed for the collection of information among the population will also be prone to the inflow of reports of varying content and credibility. What counts is solely the fact that such reports are collected. Very critical information could be found among a set of mundane matters. This, however, requires those assigned to the district or municipality, to be a part of a respected and trusted service. Unfortunately, PR crises, including the one involving the Chief Commander triggering a grenade launcher in his office, have led the social trust in the Police to a steady decline. Most of the citizens would rather avoid talking to the Police than report on matters that are seemingly worrying - like people present around critical infrastructure or a railway. Furthermore, situations entailing reputation problems may become an issue in the event that disinformation is spread, or provocations happen. Considering the current circumstances, this may be a probable scenario. Let's imagine a simple event - Ukrainian citizens are stopped by people wearing Police-like uniforms, and then they are beaten up, with xenophobic slogans being shouted by the perpetrators. The Police could deny that, but who is going to believe the denial? www.fragoutmag.com