Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1493095
the war. The whole territory of Poland may be exposed to missile strikes and air strikes. And this threat needs to be taken into the account. That means that apart from military capabilities, society also needs to be resilient. The crisis management system needs to be reinforced. The civil defense assets need to be restored. Other actions are also required, but this is a broad matter, and it deserves a separate discussion. Let me just say that state defense capabilities and the resilience of the society are placed on several pillars, and the Armed Forces are just one of them. This has been shown by what happens in Ukraine: it is impossible to counter all attacks targeting the power grid. Rapid repairs and readiness of society to function in conditions with long blackouts also remain quite important. When it comes to the military aspect, the scenarios mentioned above create a necessity to find a balance between the qualitative and quantitative expansion of the Armed Forces. One cannot pinpoint a specific area, that requires a major change. These challenges would be well visible when one considers specific capabilities that are necessary for the current, and future situation in which Poland finds itself. In the case of air defenses, these challenges are especially pronounced. On one hand, one cannot simply replace the more sophisticated system with simple counterparts - both the Patriot MRAD, as well as the SHORAD assets play an important role, and they need to go well together, as mutually complementary assets. At the same time, one needs to create a list of areas and facilities in the case of which the necessary defense efforts would bear the key relevance - this refers both to areas where the military units gather together military infrastructure (such as airbases), road nodes, or civil critical infrastructure. Therefore, the war in Ukraine confirms the necessity to establish a strong, multi-layered, integrated air defense system. Finalization of the "Wisła" and "Narew" programs is a must here. The same applies to the expanded SHORAD/VSHORAD capability - that reinforcement is already taking place, in the form of the Pilica systems now expected also to use the CAMM missile as an effector. The air defense system forms an umbrella that should push away the limited strikes. In the event of a full-scale war, such assets, together with assets deployed by the allies, should make it possible to hamper the enemy's actions or put a stop to them. The main air threat, now, and prospectively, comes in a form of land and naval, or air-launched cruise and ballistic missiles. It is also possible that Russia would be developing relatively simple UAVs (based on the Iranian experience), or procuring loitering munitions straight from Iran. The situation is somewhat different when it comes to the air force. Even though it is enough for IADS to effectively protect one's forces and assets, air operations have a broader scope. A major emphasis should be placed on air superiority, or even supremacy or dominance. Russia has a significant quantitative potential at hand, in the domain of fixed- and www.fragoutmag.com