Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1493095
the war in Ukraine seem clear. Given the fact that the Russian Armed Forces are weaker than expected, it is possible to utilize a great variety of helicopters and UAVs. So long, the Russian A2AD bubble. In these circumstances, even if Russia tries to outnumber the enemy (as the USSR did during the Cold War), active, the maneuver-based defense could be used as a response measure, making use of the qualitative advantage when it comes to detection, reaction times, and precision of the strikes. Attack helicopters carrying ATGMs complemented by multi-role helicopters and a myriad of UAVs are a good tool for the job. One should treat these types of military equipment as a priority. In Poland, however, the aforesaid capabilities are currently quite modest. Poland operates 28 Mi-24 gunships that do not use ATGMs. No in-depth upgrade of those happened in the past. It would be most reasonable to transfer all of them to Ukraine - for instance as a source of spares. Only one condition should be met if that was to happen - the new equipment should be made immediately available. US-made AH-64E helicopters are planned to be procured, within the framework of the Polish Kruk attack helicopter acquisition program. Regardless of whether the ambitious plan to get 96 examples comes true (one should take into consideration a scenario in which that number is lower), it needs to be pointed out that the Polish Apaches would constitute a core of a broader system - and this is the lens through which this procurement should be perceived. The specialized attack helicopters are soon going to be supported by UAVs to a major extent. It is also possible that multi-role helicopters armed with long- range ATGMs also take on a support role, remaining capable of carrying out stand-off strikes, away from the enemy air defenses. The system mentioned above also needs to take the land component into the account. That refers to tube artillery, rocket artillery assets, and ATGM launchers. A set of weapons as such makes it possible to attack the enemy in multiple locations, together with the air assets. The set of targets here may include C4ISR, artillery, logistical assets, as well as the reserve forces. If an expansive system with multiple sources of intelligence, and multiple effectors is available, then one can select the strike assets depending on the threat profiles and other factors (terrain, weather, time factor, or a lack of time-sensitive targets in the area). The key elements of a such system already exist, or will soon be commissioned in the Polish Armed Forces. The modernization of artillery and rocket components that is currently underway (including procurement of K9 howitzers from South Korea, HIMARS and K239 MLRS systems from the US, and South Korea, and procurement of tank busters in the Ottokar- Brzoza program, or the acquisition of unmanned assets such as Gladius) makes it possible to establish a relevant framework as such. Considering the expected land programs of different natures that are also underway - Borsuk IFV, procurement of the Abrams, and K2 main battle tanks - one may hope that Poland will be able to achieve a significant, qualitative advantage over the potential adversary. If allied support is also taken into the account, even if we are considering the Americans alone - the situation begins to look good for us, the CEE nations. Here, another burning question emerges - a very important one. Is it adequate, in these circumstances, to start a quantitative expansion of the Armed Forces, to employ 300,000 soldiers before the year 2035? Considering the ability to establish a qualitative advantage, compensating for the strengths of the Russian military, the aforesaid expansion may also have yet another dimension. One should remember that the declarations made by the decision-makers refer to the quantitative shape. But this is a general term. We know that these declarations concern, according to data unveiled during a meeting of the Parliamentary National Defense Commission in October 2022, 300,000 soldiers, including 187,000 professional soldiers, 50,000 members of the Territorial Defense Component, and 50,000 members in voluntary service, as well as soldiers receiving their education (military academia). In the case of the WOT (Territorial Defense Forces) component, most of the soldiers are not soldiers by profession. It also remains unclear how big the active reserves are expected to be, and how many soldiers would be a part of the passive reserve, expected to be mobilized in a wartime scenario. Due to the varied forms of service available, differing from professional military service, it would be desirable to tailor the military structures to those service forms. This is feasible - it is possible to establish separate training elements for those who do not call themselves professional soldiers. In the event of a potential mobilization, these units would be expanded to reach their full quantitative shape, for instance by becoming reserve mechanized brigades, artillery squadrons, units handling the www.fragoutmag.com